Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation by Khan, Mushtaq et al.
Working Paper 013
September 2019
1,2 Department of Economics, SOAS University of London.
3 Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, 
SOAS University of London.
Correspondence to: Mushtaq Khan (mk100@soas.ac.uk)
Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: 
strategies for improving implementation
Mushtaq Khan1, Antonio Andreoni2 
and Pallavi Roy3
Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation 
2 
Contents 
Abstract 3 
List of Acronyms 4 
1. Introduction 5 
2. Limitations of conventional anti-corruption approaches 8 
3. Rents, political settlements  and an alternative approach to  anti-corruption 10 
4. Evidence 13 
5. The impact and feasibility of anti-corruption strategies 16 
6. Types of corruption and anti-corruption priorities 19 
7. Anti-corruption strategies 24 
8. The research agenda 44 
References 45 
Figures 
Figure 1: Conventional anti-corruption approaches 8 
Figure 2: Feasible and high-impact anti-corruption strategies 17 
Figure 3: Welfare-enhancing responses to policy-induced corruption 20 
Figure 4: Feasibility and impact of anti-corruption strategies 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This working paper is a revised version of a paper originally published and made available 
under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence from SOAS Research Online: 
https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23495/ in January 2017. 
  
Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation 
3 
Abstract 
Developing countries are characterised by political settlements where formal rules are 
generally weakly enforced and widely violated by the powerful. Conventional anti-corruption 
strategies have typically delivered poor results in these contexts because they focus on 
improving the enforcement of a rule of law and raising the costs of corruption facing 
individual public officials. Unfortunately, in contexts where the distribution of organisational 
power allows a wide range of powerful individuals and organisations to violate rules, a 
strategy that assumes that we can strengthen the enforcement of rules is likely to result in 
poor results in the short to medium term. An alternative approach is to identify sectoral 
anti-corruption strategies that target specific problems with a high developmental impact 
and that are also feasible to implement because at least some of the powerful engaged in 
these activities are likely to support their implementation in their own interest.  
Our alternative approach identifies anti-corruption strategies from the bottom up. This 
involves identifying the characteristics of the corruption that is constraining particular 
development outcomes. By drawing on theories of rents and rent-seeking and theories of 
political settlements, we can assess both the developmental impact of specific anti-
corruption strategies and the feasibility of implementing these strategies.  
We argue that feasible anti-corruption strategies in typical developing-country contexts 
cannot be solely based on the conventional transparency, accountability and enforcement 
approach. In societies that have widespread rule violations, high-impact anti-corruption is 
only likely to be feasible if the strategy can motivate at least some powerful organisations to 
support the enforcement of specific rules. We identify four broadly defined clusters of 
strategies for creating effective anti-corruption strategies, which we describe as 1) Aligning 
incentives, 2) Designing for differences, 3) Building coalitions, and 4) Resolving rights. In each 
case, the anti-corruption strategy seeks to achieve the feasibility and impact goals in the way 
described. We argue that these clusters (and others that can emerge through further 
research) can provide a framework for organising research on the impact and feasibility of 
anti-corruption activities in priority areas in different countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Corruption is closely related to the weak enforcement of a rule of law. It involves violations 
of rules by bureaucrats, politicians and businesses who misuse power for their private 
benefit. Not surprisingly, corruption is strongly correlated with the weak enforcement of 
formal institutions in general, including property rights, and a weak adherence to the formal 
rules of democratic politics. All of these in turn also appear to be strongly correlated with 
the level of development of a country’s productive structure. Countries that have high levels 
of corruption are likely to have weak property rights, a weak rule of law, variants of political 
clientelism with many informal political rents, and low levels of productive capabilities (even 
if they sometimes have high per capita incomes if they are rich in natural resources). These 
correlations raise important questions and challenges for policy (Khan, 1995; 2002).  
Causality clearly runs in both directions. Low levels of development make it difficult to fight 
corruption and enforce formal rules, for instance because resources and incentives for 
enforcement are limited. At the same time, high levels of corruption can slow down 
development by reducing and distorting productive investments, thereby making it difficult 
to achieve the levels of development that would make further reductions of corruption 
possible. This means that while poor countries are unlikely to achieve very low levels of 
corruption, they need to achieve effective anti-corruption in critical areas to sustain their 
development and allow more significant anti-corruption efforts to become feasible over 
time. The higher levels of corruption and weaker enforcement of formal rules in developing 
countries is not an accident. The adverse distribution of productive capabilities implies a 
distribution of power in society where the powerful do not need or support the enforcement 
of a rule of law. This in turn constrains the effectiveness of strategies of rule-enforcement 
that are based on detection and punishment, because even after detection and prosecution, 
powerful rule-violators can often go free. Designing effective anti-corruption policies in 
these contexts therefore requires a strategic rethinking of anti-corruption strategies.  
Two systemic problems linked to the nature of political settlements in developing and 
emerging countries make it difficult to implement the usual top-down anti-corruption 
strategies in these contexts (Khan, 1995; 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2010; 2012). In more 
advanced countries, the distribution of power supports the enforcement of a rule of law, 
and here improvements in transparency and accountability systems can be expected to lead 
to better enforcement and therefore to a reduction in corruption across the board. But 
similar strategies are known to have produced much weaker results in developing and 
emerging countries (Rock and Bonnett, 2004; Johnsøn, et al., 2012; DFID, 2015). 
The first problem is that anti-corruption strategies that are based on the generalised 
enforcement of rules are only likely to be effective when the general enforcement of rules is 
aligned with the interests of powerful organisations in the country. When is this likely? 
Countries become more advanced as they acquire a more diverse set of productive 
organisations in different sectors and activities. As these organisations become more 
productive, they also become more powerful. They pay more taxes, fund political parties, 
employ more people and therefore begin to have a greater say in what politicians and 
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bureaucrats do. The growing complexity of the economy also means that more and more of 
these organisations begin to require the enforcement of formal rules to conduct complex 
businesses and transactions. The more complex the required rules, the greater the demand 
for generalised rule enforcement, rather than the enforcement of specific rules that benefit 
specific organisations. More economically developed societies therefore have a greater 
number and diversity of organisations that both have the incentive to want generalised rule 
enforcement and have the power to do something about it. In contrast, powerful 
organisations in less developed societies are likely to be less dependent on generalised rule-
enforcement to organise their market and political transactions. They can feasibly interact 
with each other in informal ways and generate rents through political connections. If the 
most powerful organisations in a country do not need or want the generalised enforcement 
of formal rules, it is unlikely that a rule of law will emerge simply through enforcement 
efforts by a few agencies, even with external assistance. 
Secondly, as countries become more productive and diversified, political parties can raise 
enough revenues through formal taxation and legal fundraising to maintain their party 
organisations and deliver to their political constituencies. Parties in advanced countries have 
to raise revenues from a great diversity of business interests and sectors and this sets a limit 
to special privileges that can be granted. These characteristics ensure that political parties 
have both the ability to be rule-following (because taxes and legal resources are substantial) 
and they face the compulsion to follow rules (because rule-violating parties can lose 
significant sources of funding) and this makes them rule-following for their own survival 
interests. It is not just the quantum of revenue but also the diversity of sources that is 
important. When many sectors and firms are powerful, special privileges for a few will be 
effectively opposed by many others. This explains why developing countries that have a lot 
of tax revenue from one or two sources (such as oil or gas, or a single manufacturing sector) 
do not necessarily become rule-following. The political leadership faces little effective 
compulsion from the few organisations paying taxes in these contexts to behave in rule-
following ways as long as special privileges are provided to those who control these sectors. 
In addition, political parties can raise significant revenues in informal and rule-violating ways 
in developing countries, and when in power, a politically feasible way of rewarding their 
supporters is to allow them to violate more rules. In these contexts, it is unrealistic to expect 
political leaders to exercise ‘political will’ to enforce rules when their hold on power and 
their economic interests depends on doing otherwise. This does not mean that we should 
desist from continuously putting pressure on rule violators in developing countries to begin 
to follow rules, but it does mean that we should not expect this pressure on its own to result 
in rapid transformations of business and political practices.  
Without broad support for generalised rule-following behaviour in a society from powerful 
economic or political organisations, anti-corruption strategies that assume that it is possible 
to enforce rules as soon as violations are detected and responsible individuals are identified 
are likely to be poorly implemented in practice. A feasible anti-corruption strategy in such 
contexts must be radically different. It must sequentially attack specific instances of 
corruption where the anti-corruption strategy is feasible because it has the support of 
enough powerful interests involved in that activity to make its enforcement plausible, and to 
be of policy interest, the proposed anti-corruption strategy should have a strong positive 
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impact on development. To be feasible, a combination of policy changes, institutional 
adjustments and organisational mobilisation must plausibly create sufficient support for the 
enforcement of specific anti-corruption strategies. If these bottom-up anti-corruption 
strategies also have a significant development impact, they can enable more productive 
investments and activities, better developmental outcomes and more inclusive growth, and 
can eventually help to expand the productive economy with an increase in the number of 
organisations interested in the enforcement of formal rules. Over time, this will make it 
more possible to find support for successively more ambitious anti-corruption strategies, 
and ultimately for strategies for the enforcement of a rule of law.  
The impact of corruption and therefore priority anti-corruption activities cannot be directly 
identified by looking at the magnitude of the bribes involved in different activities. An 
activity with relatively small bribes can have a high negative impact. For instance, small 
bribes could distort the enforcement of regulations on food adulteration and result in many 
deaths and diseases. In contrast, activities with significant bribes may sometimes have low 
impact. For instance, some profit-sharing transfers from businesses to politicians may have a 
low negative impact on development if the productivity of the underlying investments is not 
too adversely affected. The impact of anti-corruption therefore has to be assessed by 
looking at the overall distortion caused by the corruption, not just the magnitude of the 
rent-seeking expenditure (Khan, 2000a). At the same time the anti-corruption strategy has 
to be feasible, which usually means that the policy or institutional change required has to be 
plausible in the political context and, if implemented, has to have the support of enough 
influential actors in the sector for it to be sustained. The priority areas for anti-corruption 
will therefore clearly differ across countries depending on the structures of their economies, 
their drivers of growth, and their national and sectoral configurations of power and 
interests.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises some of the limitations of existing 
approaches to anti-corruption, section 3 outlines our alternative approach for identifying 
feasible and high-impact anti-corruption strategies. Section 4 summarises four important 
variants of feasible and high-impact anti-corruption strategies and, finally, section 5 
concludes with a summary of the type of research and policy agenda that emerges. 
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2.  Limitations of conventional anti-
corruption approaches  
Conventional anti-corruption strategies attempt to tackle corruption by improving rule-
following behaviour, particularly by public officials. One component of this has been to 
strengthen ‘good governance’, including the enforcement of a rule of law and property 
rights. This has been supported by evidence that appears to show correlations between 
governance variables like the degree to which a rule of law is enforced and levels of 
corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1996; Rauch and Evans, 2000; Treisman, 2000; World Bank, 
2000; Lambsdorff, 2005;). Another component of these conventional approaches draws on 
microeconomic principal-agent models to argue that asymmetric information may allow 
public officials to subvert the public purpose by engaging in corruption in pursuit of their 
own self-interest. The policy response that follows from this perspective is to attempt to 
change the behaviour of bureaucrats with better information and monitoring, and through 
changes in incentives like better pay structures and stricter punishments (Rose-Ackerman, 
1978; Klitgaard, 1988; Andvig and Moene, 1990; Huther and Shah, 2000; Spector, 2005). 
Figure 1: Conventional anti-corruption approaches 
 
Source: Authors 
The vast majority of conventional anti-corruption strategies are therefore based on a 
combination of strategies to improve the enforcement of formal rules across the board, 
together with policies that seek to change the cost-benefit calculations of individual public 
officials in a context of asymmetric information, as summarised in Figure 1. However, these 
approaches have not delivered satisfactory results because both approaches assume that 
developing countries are generally rule-following contexts with occasional violations that 
can be addressed with improvements in good governance, transparency and accountability. 
In fact, generalised rule-following behaviour is more or less absent in most developing and 
emerging societies and cannot be immediately established for structural reasons that 
include the configuration of power in these societies. If we cannot immediately make 
societies substantially rule-following, anti-corruption strategies that assume that this can be 
done are likely to fail.  
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Moreover, strategies that seek to change the behaviour of individual bureaucrats are also 
likely to fail if they ignore the fact that these public officials are operating in networks and 
social contexts where the powerful are able to violate rules. How this happens may differ 
across developing countries. In some, the powerful at the top of the political and 
bureaucratic hierarchy have greater discretion to define and change rules according to their 
interests, while preventing lower levels from violating rules set for them. In other countries, 
higher and lower levels of the hierarchy may both violate rules independently. But these 
differences should not hide the common characteristic of both settings that rules cannot be 
credibly enforced on the powerful in these contexts. Indeed, individual bureaucrats or 
politicians who insist on following rules are likely to find their career prospects limited or 
they may even be removed or transferred to less important positions so as not to obstruct 
the flow of resources within powerful networks of bureaucrats, politicians and businesses.  
The limitations of standard anti-corruption strategies are now widely recognised, and the 
underlying reasons are entirely consistent with our analysis of political settlements. For 
instance, a review by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) of anti-corruption strategies shows that most fail because they ignore critically 
important policy interdependencies. These interdependencies include those between the 
micro-level calculations of individual public officials and their reinforcement by political, 
social and cultural structures at the macro-level; and the interdependencies between 
policies targeted by anti-corruption strategies and other policies and institutions that 
contribute to persistent corruption ( Johnsøn et al., 2012; DFID 2015). These observations 
recognise the entrenchment of corruption in societies where rule violations are widespread, 
and where many activities involve informal arrangements. In these contexts – which are far 
removed from having a rule of law – policies that attempt to improve the enforcement of 
formal rules or change the behaviour of individuals with formal incentives are very likely to 
have limited immediate effects or to fail entirely.  
A related aspect is that conventional anti-corruption strategies often confuse policy 
variables, which are variables that decision-makers can change (including some institutions 
and organisations), with institutional, organisational and political characteristics of countries 
that are outcomes of evolutionary changes that lead to important structural transformations 
over time (Khan, 2018). The latter cannot be immediately changed by policy. The quality of 
the rule of law in a country or the independence of its judiciary are examples of institutional 
characteristics that are outcomes of complex processes involving many interdependent 
institutions and organisations. They are not immediate policy variables. A policy-maker 
cannot ‘decide’ to improve the rule of law in a society where enforcement is weak. While 
the evidence showing correlations between corruption and ‘variables’ like the rule of law is 
not wrong, the latter are not policy variables, and the evidence is therefore not very useful 
for policy-makers. The correlations pick up characteristics that tend to go together: societies 
that have achieved a rule of law are likely to have low levels of corruption, but this does not 
tell us how they got there. 
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3. Rents, political settlements  
and an alternative approach to  
anti-corruption  
Analysis of rents and political settlements provides related theoretical insights that are 
important for our alternative anti-corruption analysis (Khan, 2002, 2006a, 2006b). The aim 
of feasible anti-corruption is to identify policy changes that can successfully reconfigure 
incentives to reduce corruption and improve development outcomes, but that do so in such 
a way that the rules will be supported by enough influential stakeholders for adherence to 
be plausible. All anti-corruption strategies attempt to reconfigure incentives, but most of the 
time they do not ask two fundamental questions: who is going to enforce the new rules? 
And are the new rules likely to be distorted by the interests of those whose behaviour they 
are trying to change? In contexts where the rule of law is weak, these are vitally important 
questions and overlooking them explains the failure of most anti-corruption initiatives. 
Instead, given the weakness of formal enforcement structures in these countries, our 
approach is to investigate if it is possible to reconfigure incentives in such a way that at least 
some powerful players will support the enforcement of these rules in their own interest, to 
achieve improvements for themselves, while also achieving developmental outcomes. This 
combination of conditions is more demanding, which is why feasible anti-corruption with 
significant developmental impacts is hard to identify in developing countries. However, we 
argue that such instances can be identified, and they are the obvious starting point for 
feasible anti-corruption efforts.  
To identify these opportunities, we need to understand the ways in which different types of 
rents are being allocated and appropriated in a sector or activity, the beneficiaries of these 
rents, and the social outcomes attained as a result. This starting point can help us to identify 
the rent-seeking processes through which different interests distort the achievement of 
development outcomes. Through this analysis we often find that the same activity attracts 
different types of rents and violations, and that different participants may violate rules for 
very different reasons. We need to understand these processes in some detail because what 
may appear to be a simple corruption problem is usually a complex one with different types 
of violations happening simultaneously. Secondly, we also need to assess the relative 
organisational power of the different interests involved in the activity to understand the 
potential support for and resistance to specific policy changes, and therefore the feasibility 
of constructing a solution that is likely to be self-enforcing.  
The first part of the analysis is therefore to understand the diversity of ‘rents’ involved in the 
relevant sector or activity, and the types of corruption that may be associated with each. The 
work of Joseph Stiglitz and other economists has shown that different types of rents 
(broadly defined as incremental income flows associated with particular policies or 
institutions) can have complex effects on social outcomes (Stiglitz, 1989, 1996). Some rents 
are essential for markets to work well and for improved development outcomes (for 
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instance efficiency wages or health-sector subsidies), while other rents can destroy value 
and block development (for example monopoly rents or predatory extractions). The 
existence of rents (even socially useful variants) is always likely to induce rent-seeking 
activities that attempt to influence the allocation or protection of particular rents, imposing 
an additional cost on society (Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975; Khan, 2000a). Corruption is a 
variant of illegal rent-seeking that is likely to emerge in contexts where the rule of law is 
weak, and is most damaging when it supports the persistence of rents, or distorts or 
destroys developmental rents (Khan, 2000a, 2000b, 2004).  
State policies and institutions create formal rents when they introduce taxes or subsidies, 
allocate rights over resources like land or natural resources, create employment in public 
organisations, or introduce regulations that impose costs and benefits on different parties 
and so on. When the rule of law is weak, rent-seeking activities are likely to be informal and 
illegal and, like with all rent-seeking, they can further influence the allocation of rents across 
different beneficiaries. In every case, the allocation of rents and the conditions that are 
formally or informally attached to their allocation (and the enforceability of these 
conditions) determines the developmental outcomes that are likely to follow. For instance, 
the state may allocate subsidies to hospitals, but the development outcome depends on 
how politicians, hospital management, doctors, nurses, medical suppliers and others bargain 
over the allocation of these resources (the rent-seeking process) and the types of doctors, 
nurses, supplies and so on that are procured as a result (the outcome). Corruption usually 
describes a wide range of illegal or informal rent-seeking activities through which public 
officials, businesses and other organisations seek to influence the allocation of rents (Khan 
2000a, 2000b, 2005a).  
The economic consequences of corruption therefore depend on how it alters the allocation 
of different types of rents. Not surprisingly, corruption can have different effects depending 
on the rents being allocated by policies or institutions and how corruption distorts these 
allocations. Some corruption is a response to policies that restrict certain activities without 
any social benefit, for instance by restricting entry through licensing. They create rents for 
privileged firms but threaten the profits of others. These restrictions can generate 
corruption because excluded businesses will try to pay to work around these restrictions. In 
this case, anti-corruption only makes sense if it is combined with a policy of removing the 
restrictions that drove the corruption in the first place: stopping the corruption that allows 
businesses to work around welfare-reducing restrictions while keeping the restrictions in 
place would only make society worse off. On the other hand, other types of corruption can 
undermine potentially useful policies by diverting rents that may have induced a beneficial 
social outcome. For instance, government subsidies to the private sector to invest in cleaner 
or more productive technologies can fail if firms use bribes to obtain the resources but flout 
the conditions attached to these subsidies. However, in fighting this type of corruption, the 
underlying policies should not necessarily be thrown out. Here, we have to think of changing 
the policy design to ensure that the rents become more difficult to capture without fulfilling 
the conditions attached to them, and at the same time make it more feasible for firms to 
fulfil these conditions, if they were unrealistic to begin with.  
Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation 
12 
In more complex cases we may simultaneously have different types of rents coexisting in an 
activity and careful analysis is required to identify what needs to be done. For instance, if 
there are different types of firms in a sector, generalised policies that define minimum 
standards for all firms may result in some finding these policies to be restrictive to the point 
of putting them out of business (which may sometimes reduce net social welfare). Other 
firms that may have complied with the standards may choose not to do so in future if 
corruption is a feasible alternative. In these cases, an anti-corruption strategy must consider 
the differences in the rent-seeking motivations of different firms and devise the policy mix 
that maximises the social benefit.  
The second component of our anti-corruption analysis is to take into account the 
configuration of power across the interests involved in certain instances of corruption, as 
this can determine support for or opposition to particular strategies that seek to alter the 
allocation of rents. An important strand of recent research we draw on is the literature on 
how governance in developing countries is constrained by the configuration of their political 
settlements (Khan, 1995, 2010, 2012; Roy, 2012). This research has established that the poor 
enforcement of formal institutions in developing countries is not an anomaly that can be 
solved simply by investing in enforcement agencies, by supporting transparency initiatives or 
by improving agency capacities to enforce the rule of law. These top-down initiatives can 
sometimes help, but the configuration of organisational capabilities and powers in 
developing countries means that informal processes of rent allocation and informally 
enforced transactions between powerful organisations are likely to remain important for 
some time. This reflects the fact that powerful organisations in these contexts have ways of 
doing business that are better from their perspective than supporting a rule of law. In 
particular, informal networks of power such as patron-client networks are likely to continue 
to distort the operation of formal institutions in these countries.  
The analysis of political settlements (Khan, 2010, 2018) therefore provides a framework for 
exploring how the distribution of organisational power can constrain or enable particular 
types of institutional and policy changes. Policies and institutions are only likely to be 
implemented if their enforcement is supported by a powerful-enough coalition in whose 
interest it is to enforce these rules, and which is powerful enough to ensure a high level of 
adherence. Assessing the relative power of different interests in a sector (both formal and 
informal) is therefore essential. Anti-corruption policies in contexts with a weak rule of law 
are only likely to be successful if at least some powerful organisations support their 
implementation. This is not likely if we are looking to rule out all corruption immediately, but 
it may be possible to target specific types of corruption if the anti-corruption strategy is 
aligned with the interests of certain groups that possess power. If research can find such 
opportunities, there is a chance that the activity of self-interested key participants in a 
sector can be aligned with the enforcement of a policy that reduces corruption and 
enhances developmental outcomes (Khan, 2013). 
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4.  Evidence  
Our assessment of the poor performance of standard anti-corruption strategies is consistent 
with the findings of a number of recent surveys of the corruption literature (Johnsøn et al., 
2012; DFID, 2015). Analysis of different and overlapping types of corruption in various 
political settlements can help to explain why corruption appears to be so resistant to 
conventional anti-corruption strategies. Political settlements across developing countries are 
such that powerful organisations do not need a rule of law to do business and therefore do 
not effectively support the enforcement of a rule of law (Khan, 2010, 2018). In these 
contexts, quite specific policies may be required to address sectoral corruption if the 
evidence suggests there are coalitions that could (out of self-interest) support the 
enforcement of rules that have developmental outcomes. This assessment would depend on 
an analysis of the relevant political settlement that describes the relative power and 
capabilities of organisations affected by the proposed policy changes. Both the differences in 
rents across sectors and countries, and differences in the relevant political settlements, 
means that the same policy responses will not be feasible in every context.  
A rents and political-settlements approach can also help to explain why the effects of 
corruption appear to vary so much across contexts. If quite different types of corruption are 
involved across contexts, the ‘average’ effects of corruption picked up by statistical analysis 
will depend on the mix of behaviours in the countries, sectors and time periods sampled. 
Corruption can therefore paradoxically appear to be compatible with rapid development in 
some cases (like the East Asian tigers in the 1960s or China in the 1980s) while being 
seriously damaging in many other developing countries (Rock and Bonnett, 2004; Khan, 
2006a, 2006b). In the same way, statistical attempts to identify the efficacy of anti-
corruption policies also pick up very weak results (Treisman, 2000).  
Our two lenses can help explain this paradox. First, different policy combinations will be 
required if countries face diverse corruption with different and overlapping rents across 
sectors. Strategies that may work in one country or sector will fail in another, and pooled 
testing may give poor results for any specific strategy. Secondly, different policy 
combinations may be required to address the same types of rents that exist in different 
political contexts. This too would require adjustments for different configurations of power. 
These interdependencies mean that standard econometric approaches to identify the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies are likely to fail because of inadequate data. 
4.1. Evidence on corruption and the private sector  
The ability of the private sector to do business in corrupt environments appears to vary 
widely across sectors and countries, as do the apparent effects of corruption that is driven 
by the private sector. Private-sector corruption can include behaviour and activities to 
overcome obstacles to doing business, but may also include corruption to influence formal 
or informal policies that prevent entry, allow the survival of inefficient firms, overpricing, 
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regulatory failures, investments in the wrong sectors, and so on, where the private sector is 
the primary driver of the problem.  
A few policy instruments cannot address all of these problems. General improvements in 
governance, the rule of law and ‘doing business’ conditions can help, but progress is likely to 
be slow in developing-country political settlements for the reasons discussed earlier. Anti-
corruption analysts therefore increasingly recognise the importance of country and sector 
specificities in designing effective programmes (Spector, 2005; Campos and Pradhan, 2007), 
which aligns with the results of the analysis here. 
The private sector can be a victim or perpetrator of corruption, or both. Often it is a victim 
and is vocal against it, while at other times it is primarily a beneficiary, driving corruption 
through links with bureaucrats and politicians. The anomalous position of the private sector 
means that its support for anti-corruption initiatives through business associations and other 
means has usually been half-hearted and largely ineffective in developing countries. In many 
countries, almost all firms are involved in some type of corruption, and even firms that are 
victims will often not want to destabilise business arrangements by exposing their own 
involvement in corruption. In certain cases, the political settlement is such that almost all 
business operations involve some informal or corrupt activity, and this constrains firms from 
taking their complaints too far, because public officials can expose them in other areas. In 
this context, general anti-corruption strategies are unlikely to work, and even very specific 
ones need to be carefully designed to align interests with feasibility.  
The types of corruption a firm can engage in are also likely to change over time, as the 
economy evolves, as firm capabilities change, as governments and policies come and go, and 
so on. Evidence and analysis of this is critical for identifying feasible and high-impact anti-
corruption strategies in sectors, and to create incentives to induce potentially compliant 
firms to begin to support anti-corruption measures. Our work on private-sector corruption 
has demonstrated the usefulness of process analysis for identifying different types of rents 
and rent-seeking processes in particular activities, and therefore the necessary policy 
combinations required for effective anti-corruption strategies in these contexts (Khan, 2014; 
Mathieson, 2014).  
The World Bank’s Doing Business initiative has been valuable in identifying restrictions that 
constrain business by increasing transaction costs, which in turn can induce specific types of 
corruption as businesses try to overcome obstacles. However, it would be misleading to 
assume that private-sector corruption in general can be addressed simply by reducing 
unnecessary market restrictions and by improving the service-delivery functions of the state. 
Unnecessary restrictions are one of many drivers of corruption in the private sector. 
Moreover, the different types of corruption triggered by restrictions often do not satisfy our 
criteria of having a high impact, even if it is feasible to address certain behaviours through 
the simplification of procedures. Not enough attention has been given to corruption driven 
by other types of rents that the private sector has been implicated in, sometimes as a victim 
but often as a driver, which are often much more important in explaining damaging 
development outcomes.  
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4.2. Evidence on policy interdependencies that affect anti-
corruption  
Existing research shows that with the exception of a small number of technical measures like 
public financial management (PFM), the vast majority of anti-corruption interventions 
supported by international development partners have had weak and contested impact on 
levels of corruption (Johnsøn et al., 2012). Attempts to discover effective policy 
combinations through cross-country comparisons have also delivered limited results. One 
reason for this is that while there are clear interdependencies between anti-corruption 
policies and other factors and variables, it is very difficult to identify effective policy 
combinations using regression analysis. The interdependencies are too numerous to unravel 
using cross-country data, because the number of variables that may potentially be 
interdependent is large relative to the available data. Equally, just saying that ‘context 
matters’ does not help. Generating useful evidence depends on effective strategies for 
making the problem of interdependence tractable for analysis.  
Societies are constituted differently – politically, institutionally and culturally – and this 
results in varying configurations of power across organisations. Using the framework of 
political settlements to look for feasible policy choices allows us both to identify and explain 
what is working in these countries, and to generate hypotheses on combinations of policies 
that may be effective and implementable. We have to make explicit not only the 
combinations of policy variables that could address specific sectoral rent problems, but also 
the particular configuration of organisational power – the political settlement – that makes it 
likely that a proposed solution is feasible to implement. An analysis of interdependence 
must therefore draw on an understanding of rents and corruption typologies as well as an 
analysis of political settlements, with the objective being to identify potentially effective 
anti-corruption policies to improve development outcomes given the configurations of 
organisational power in that sector and society.  
For this reason, analysis of policy interdependence should focus on specific sectoral 
questions otherwise the number of interdependencies is likely to become unmanageably 
large. At the highest level of aggregation (the developing country as a whole), there are 
likely to be so many interdependent institutional and governance weaknesses that effective 
policy would require that too many difficult problems be fixed simultaneously. Lack of 
feasibility in this respect is one reason why ambitious ‘good governance’ reforms have not 
resulted in positive results in most developing countries. This too supports the recognition 
that anti-corruption has to have a strong sectoral focus and work from the bottom up 
(Campos and Pradhan, 2007). 
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5. The impact and feasibility of anti-
corruption strategies  
Measuring the developmental impact of specific instances of corruption is not simple, partly 
because of the secrecy associated with corrupt practices and partly because existing 
approaches often confuse the magnitude of corruption, as measured by the value of bribes 
or other rent-seeking expenditures or the level of fraud or other rule-breaking behaviour, 
with the impact of corruption. Standard approaches to the quantification of corruption 
include surveys based on perceptions or the observation of proxy characteristics correlated 
with the corruption. But each of these approaches has its problems (Søreide, 2006). For 
instance, surveys based on perceptions implicitly measure the magnitude of corruption but 
have the problem of subjective distortion. The definition of corruption is also very broad and 
does not distinguish between different types of behaviours. Using proxies (such as delays in 
health delivery, or leakages from budgets) implicitly measures the impact of corruption 
because they estimate outcomes. However, the problem with these outcome or impact 
measures is that variations (for instance in delays in health delivery) may be due to factors 
other than corruption. There is therefore a need for new types of evidence, and to develop 
the usefulness and applicability of existing proxy indicators and other approaches.  
Furthermore, while the magnitude of corruption measures the extent of rent-seeking 
expenditures, it often ignores the relevance of the different types of rents that may be 
involved. A rents analysis shows that the impact of corruption depends not only on the 
magnitude of corruption but also on how these distort the management of specific rents 
that affect the achievement of important developmental goals. This is why the same level of 
corruption can have very different effects on development outcomes (Khan, 2000a, 2000b). 
Indeed, relatively small bribes in some activities (for instance to evade rules on building 
regulations or food safety) can do a lot more damage to human lives and welfare than bigger 
bribes elsewhere. This knowledge can help the prioritisation of policy in contexts where 
aggregate levels of corruption may take time to reduce, given the characteristics of the 
political settlement. If we can identify corruption that has a high negative impact and that is 
also feasible to reduce in the ways discussed, effective anti-corruption efforts can be 
designed in a targeted manner. 
The impact of a potential anti-corruption strategy should measure the estimated effect of 
that strategy on development outcomes, which can help to determine the prioritisation of 
targeting feasible types of corruption in an anti-corruption strategy. The assessment of 
impact must estimate the effect of specific corruption processes on developmental 
outcomes, which could be economic growth, but could also be other outcomes like 
environmental protection, economic diversification, the inclusion of the poor or women, 
health outcomes, distributive justice and so on, depending on the characteristics of the 
sector or activity being assessed.  
The feasibility of an anti-corruption strategy is a measure of the probability of successfully 
implementing the strategy. While targeting a low-impact variant of corruption can waste 
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policy resources even if it can be implemented, a policy that addresses a high-impact variant 
that is not feasible to implement can equally waste resources. Feasibility can be measured 
along a variety of dimensions: how many policies need to be changed, how many 
governance capabilities need to be improved, how much resistance there is to each of these 
changes from powerful organisations, and so on. Therefore the approach to assessing 
feasibility will depend on the type of corruption in the sector or activity being studied. The 
objective is not necessarily so precise as to rank the difficulty of implementation of different 
anti-corruption strategies, but at least to assess whether the investment in a specific anti-
corruption strategy is justified given the likely support and resistance coming from powerful 
groups and therefore the likely risk of failure.  
Ultimately, an effective anti-corruption strategy will have to satisfy an acceptable mix of 
impact and feasibility. The feasibility aspect is critically important but is often entirely 
ignored in many anti-corruption policy discussions. Given the weak capacity to enforce 
formal rules in the typical developing or emerging country, feasibility requires a sufficiently 
high level of effective support for the policy by the stakeholders involved in the activity or 
sector. Support is deemed effective when those who claim they support the anti-corruption 
policy can be seen to also have an interest in its implementation and have the organisational 
power (relative to other stakeholders) to support enforcement. If such support is likely to be 
forthcoming from at least some influential players within the sector, feasible improvements 
in governance capabilities may suffice to improve rule adherence in the sector and improve 
developmental outcomes. This approach to feasible and high-impact anti-corruption is 
summarised in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Feasible and high-impact anti-corruption strategies 
 
Source: Authors 
Our sectoral, incremental and bottom-up approach to anti-corruption requires identification 
of strategies that can create localised support for enforcement. This in turn involves 
identifying the incentives and characteristics of critical organisations involved in specific 
corruption processes. By analysing the rent-capture processes and the relative power and 
capabilities of the organisations involved, it is possible to assess the feasibility of creating 
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coalitions for anti-corruption in that sector or activity. In section 7 we discuss four broad 
clusters of anti-corruption strategies that can help to create coalitions to support anti-
corruption in different contexts.  
Our approach to anti-corruption supports a different and more ambitious theory of change 
than standard approaches to anti-corruption that are based on transparency, accountability 
and the enforcement of the rule of law. The proposition is that, in countries where levels of 
development and political settlements do not yet allow the effective enforcement of 
generalised formal rules, corruption levels will incrementally decline at an accelerating pace 
if we can identify sectoral anti-corruption strategies that can sequentially target corruption 
in activities where anti-corruption is both feasible and has a high impact. This is because 
these targeted strategies will enhance developmental outcomes, helping to create a more 
broad-based economy with a growing number of powerful organisations that will want rule 
enforcement in their own interest. Successively more ambitious anti-corruption strategies 
will then become possible until eventually strategies targeting higher-level institutional 
characteristics like the enforcement of a rule of law or society-level transparency and 
accountability become more likely.  
Thus, both the incremental, bottom-up strategy described in Figure 2 and the conventional, 
top-down or systemic approaches to anti-corruption described in Figure 1 are likely to be 
required at different stages of development. The more ambitious top-down anti-corruption 
strategies based on the enforcement of a rule of law and transparency and accountability 
are likely to gain policy relevance at higher levels of development when productive 
capabilities become broadly dispersed in society. The greater the productivity and 
complexity of the economy, the more likely that a large number of powerful organisations 
will have an effective demand for a rule of law, be prepared to pay for its enforcement, and 
be engaged in the horizontal enforcement of formal rules on each other, which makes the 
occasional vertical enforcement feasible. When powerful organisations refuse to deal with 
peers who do not follow rules, enforcement agencies attempting to identify and punish rule 
violators are able to operate with a high chance of success.  
These conditions are missing in most developing countries, however. In a typical developing 
country, a more important type of anti-corruption strategy is likely to be the bottom-up, 
sector-specific approach based on identifying feasible policy combinations that attract a 
sufficient number of productive organisations to play by the rules in specific activities and 
sectors, and to support external enforcement in these specific activities. The critical 
difference here is that the content of the policies and strategies is of great importance, 
because we need to identify strategies that are likely to be largely self-enforcing within the 
sector, with a limited requirement for vertical enforcement. However, most anti-corruption 
efforts in developing countries do not satisfy these requirements, and work on the false 
premise that rules can be enforced in the country if general enforcement incentives and 
capabilities can be improved. Our approach to anti-corruption in the SOAS University of 
London Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOAS-ACE) programme focuses on identifying 
opportunities of the first type, looking for feasible sectoral opportunities, as we believe 
these are the appropriate starting point for an effective long-term anti-corruption strategy.  
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6. Types of corruption and anti-
corruption priorities  
Our rents analysis allows us to distinguish between different types of corruption, based on 
Khan’s (2006a) classification. This reveals some general characteristics of different types of 
corruption and indicates the feasibility and impact of anti-corruption strategies targeting 
each type of corruption, based on the analysis outlined earlier. While several types of 
corruption can coexist in particular sectors and activities, it is useful to assess separately the 
potential impact and feasibility of strategies that target individual types of corruption.  
Corruption driven by market restrictions emerges when there are unnecessary or damaging 
market distortions created by states either deliberately or inadvertently, which are in turn 
evaded by businesses and individuals engaging in corruption. Corruption of this type is a 
response to restrictions like unnecessary red tape, barriers to entry, or regulations that are 
either unnecessary (from the perspective of social welfare) or that the state does not have 
the capacity to enforce but which can block productive business activities. These types of 
market distortions and restrictions create damaging rents by preventing entry into sectors or 
activities. Corruption of this type can paradoxically reduce the effects of damaging 
restrictions by using corruption to by-pass some restrictions. This type of ‘greasing the 
wheels’ is indeed efficiency-enhancing in a superficial sense, but the problem is that it 
generates incentives for the persistence of distortions and the creation of new restrictions. If 
this type of corruption is not addressed, the overall efficiency of the economy is likely to 
decline over time.  
This is the type of corruption that is implicitly targeted in the World Bank’s Doing Business 
surveys. Clearly, the anti-corruption strategy for this type of corruption must be to 
simultaneously remove the market distortions, otherwise society can be made worse off by 
an anti-corruption strategy that blocks the corruption that seeks to by-pass the restrictions, 
but that keeps the original restrictions in place.  
In contrast, in policy-distorting corruption the underlying state policies and associated rents 
are potentially socially useful, but corruption can prevent these policies from achieving 
development goals. For instance, health, education, environmental or technology upgrading 
policies implicitly create rents for different types of organisations that are incentivised to 
provide important services or to engage in socially beneficial activities that will otherwise 
not happen. If these rents and the policies allocating them are distorted by corruption, 
socially desired outcomes may not be achieved. This is potentially a high-impact type of 
corruption in many developing countries. When corruption distorts the implementation of 
developmental policies the consequences can be very serious. Conversely, the failure to 
design policies and regulations in ways that can withstand likely attempts at distortions can 
result in seriously constrained development.  
The impact of policy-distorting corruption can vary greatly across sectors and countries. In 
some cases, this type of corruption results in very limited policy distortion and mainly 
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redistributes the benefits of the policy between businesses and public officials. For instance, if 
public officials have the capacity to assist businesses to achieve greater productivity and 
profitability, and they have the capacity to discipline businesses if they fail to raise 
productivity, public officials can corruptly claim a share of the rapidly increasing profits of 
successful firms without this corruption significantly distorting the development outcome. This 
type of profit-sharing corruption emerged, for instance, in the granting of industrial policy 
support to South Korea’s chaebol in the 1960s and 1970s and in profit-sharing corruption in 
China in the 1980s. This corruption was undesirable but it did not seriously distort policy 
because public officials had no incentive to support failure. The configuration of power 
ensured that public officials made more in kickbacks by withdrawing support from failing 
businesses and supporting successful ones. This corruption did not therefore constrain the 
countries’ development even though it was of a substantial magnitude (Khan, 2000a).  
In other cases, corruption can seriously distort policy, for instance by allowing failing 
organisations to keep on getting rents without delivering productivity growth or other 
services for which the rents were ostensibly allocated. A critical determinant of poor 
outcomes being sustained is the distribution of power between public officials and rent-
receiving organisations that prevents the former from withdrawing rents even when 
outcomes are very poor. Thus, while policy-distorting corruption is always damaging, the 
effects can vary significantly across cases depending on the characteristics of the relevant 
political settlements. An assessment of the severity of the impact of policy-distorting 
corruption in different sectors and the feasibility of responses is an important part of 
identifying high-impact anti-corruption strategies.  
Figure 3 summarises the critical differences between these two types of corruption. In one 
case the anti-corruption strategy is to remove the underlying restrictive policies that drive 
corruption, while in the other, the anti-corruption strategy should maintain the policy while 
redesigning it in ways that make anti-corruption feasible. This underlines why an analysis of 
the rents involved in different types of corruption is vitally important. Policies and 
interventions that are market-restricting and those that are potentially beneficial are not 
always clearly distinguishable. Nevertheless, analysis must attempt to identify the types of 
policies and rents that are involved. Without that, an anti-corruption strategy can 
inadvertently do more harm than good. Moreover, the same sector may have multiple 
players and policies so that some of the corruption in the sector may be driven by market 
restrictions and some may be policy-distorting. In these cases, which are not uncommon, a 
detailed sectoral analysis is required to identify the welfare-enhancing anti-corruption policy 
combinations. 
Figure 3: Welfare-enhancing responses to policy-induced corruption 
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Political corruption describes rent creation and allocation through informal patron-client 
networks through which powerful groups maintain their power, particularly in political 
settlements where informal resource flows are a critical part of political allocations. As this 
type of corruption is driven by the reproduction strategies of competing political groups, it is 
difficult to fight it in developing countries where patron-client politics and informal rent 
flows play an important role in politics (Khan, 2005a, 2010; North et al., 2013).  
The reduction of political corruption is a longer-term challenge and is related to our theory 
of change on the importance of creating a more diversified and productive society. The 
emergence of diverse organisations capable of paying significant taxes creates the tax base 
for competing parties to win elections by promising to spend a large formal budget. It also 
applies pressure on ruling coalitions to abide by rules in spending taxes as these are paid by 
organisations that need a rule of law to sustain their businesses. If this configuration of 
power does not exist, the most feasible strategy for fighting political corruption is to support 
the development of a diversified society with feasible anti-corruption strategies. The failure 
to understand the drivers of political corruption has resulted in many anti-corruption 
initiatives failing. If powerful political and business actors are engaged in reproducing their 
power and access to resources through sustained rule violations, transparency and 
accountability reforms are unlikely to have much effect. Rule violations are then very likely 
to continue to happen. An analysis of the political settlement provides the background 
information to identify the feasibility of different interventions in these contexts, without 
becoming demoralised by failures that are to be expected given the political settlements of 
these societies.  
Finally, predatory corruption is a particularly damaging variant of corruption where coercion 
and violence are used by powerful groups to extract rents. This type of corruption becomes 
dominant at advanced stages of state failure, but some element of predatory corruption can 
take place in all societies. Fortunately, it is not the dominant form of corruption in most 
cases.  
When predatory corruption becomes the dominant form of corruption, the society has 
become a warlord society and is close to or already engaged in high levels of violence. The 
strategy of developing sectoral economic activities still remains the most viable intervention 
here, but this is even less likely to have any impact on overall levels of corruption in these 
contexts. State-building activities and the organisation of a less violent political settlement 
become priorities for societies where predatory corruption has become dominant. Predatory 
corruption is only likely to decline if the ruling coalition acquires the legitimacy to rule 
without excessive repression. This, in turn, requires that the coalition includes previously 
excluded violent groups in a share of the rents. The longer time horizon that such a ruling 
coalition remains in power also gives it the capacity to rein in its own supporters engaged in 
predatory activities.  
All of this is hugely challenging and is essentially a political and organisational task that seeks 
to achieve changes in the characteristics of the political settlement. Our understanding of 
the policies that can change political settlements is still very rudimentary, to say the least. 
Misguided policies that have sought to create new political settlements in conflict and post-
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conflict settings have often resulted in damaging unintended consequences. Effective policy 
responses to high levels of predatory corruption are therefore extremely challenging given 
our existing state of knowledge.  
Figure 4: Feasibility and impact of anti-corruption strategies 
 
Source: Based on Khan (2014) 
Based on the discussion above, Figure 4 locates anti-corruption strategies targeting each of 
these types of corruption in terms of their relative impact and feasibility. The sectoral 
corruption that we want to target is likely to involve several overlapping types of corruption, 
and this should be kept in mind in reading Figure 4. One should also remember that sectoral 
corruption may have mixed characteristics when assessing the feasibility of an effective 
sectoral anti-corruption strategy. For instance, if policy-distorting corruption in a sector also 
has characteristics of political or predatory corruption, the anti-corruption policy may have 
low feasibility even if its expected impact is likely to be high.  
Market restriction-driven corruption is likely to be the most feasible type of corruption to 
address because this involves the removal of restrictions that may be feasible to target in 
many cases. High-powered political organisations are less likely to be dependent on these 
usually petty corruption incomes and may even be persuaded that the removal of some of 
this corruption may be in their own interest. On the other hand, the impact on development 
outcomes may not be particularly high either. In developing countries, development is 
usually blocked by the absence of productive capabilities and significant market failures, and 
mainly not by the blocking of activities of high-capability firms by unnecessary restrictions. In 
general, therefore, anti-corruption strategies that target market restrictions are likely to be 
relatively more feasible but also to have a more limited impact on development outcomes 
taken on their own.   
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In contrast, policy-distorting corruption can have a range of outcomes, the negative impact 
of which can be very high in many developing. But political interests are also more likely to 
focus on the allocation and management of these rents. This can make policy-distorting 
corruption difficult to address because it gets mixed up with political corruption. 
Nevertheless, strategies that target policy-distorting corruption have the most favourable 
levels and combination of impact and feasibility, and therefore are the most important type 
of corruption from the SOAS-ACE perspective. Many variants of policy-distorting corruption 
are relatively feasible to target while delivering a high impact if the corrupt behaviour is 
eradicated or reduced. However, some variants can be quite difficult to target because they 
may be very closely tied to political corruption. For instance, bank lending rules may be 
violated to benefit politically connected companies that also happen to be inefficient. Here, 
the corruption involved is not only policy-distorting but also has elements of political 
corruption and may therefore be difficult to address. This is shown by the arrow linking 
some policy-distorting corruption to political corruption in Figure 4. Political corruption 
describes a range of rent-creation and allocation strategies that are widespread in 
developing countries and that are linked to the nature of their political settlements. Some 
political rent allocations may have a relatively benign impact (if they are largely 
redistributive) and some may have a very malign impact (if they distort economic policies or 
result in political violence). In general, political corruption is much more difficult to address 
because powerful political organisations are involved. This means that despite the high 
impact of some of these types of corruption, anti-corruption strategies may not fulfil the 
condition of feasibility in many contexts. A further danger of political corruption is that at 
the margins it can change into predatory corruption, and this is shown by the arrow linking 
political to predatory corruption in Figure 4. This can happen, for instance, if the ruling 
coalition becomes increasingly repressive. This can trigger excluded groups into violence and 
warlordism, and can also create short-termism within the ruling coalition, inducing some of 
its members to engage in predatory activities and take their spoils to safe havens outside the 
country.   
Predatory corruption is the most damaging variant of corruption. In extreme cases, 
predatory corruption can result in the cessation of most normal productive activities and 
investments. Societies where warlords dominate develop variants of war economies where 
developmental outcomes are heavily constrained. Predatory corruption is also typically the 
most difficult type of corruption to address. Powerful organisations involved acquire 
substantial violence potential, and violence usually leads to the entrenchment of zero-sum 
attitudes on the part of protagonists, making compromise and rent-sharing less likely to 
emerge.   
Most sectors and activities in developing countries are likely to feature a mix of all of these 
types of corruption, and a process analysis of different types of rents is essential to uncover 
what is going on in each. In general, the biggest gains are likely to be achieved by anti-
corruption strategies that target policy-distorting corruption, though several types of 
corruption may have to be simultaneously addressed in particular sectors and activities. In 
many contexts, anti-corruption strategies are likely to have to address combinations of 
market restrictions and policy design problems that drive different types of corruption in the 
same sector or activity.  
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7.  Anti-corruption strategies  
It follows from our discussion that anti-corruption strategies in developing countries are only 
likely to be feasible if they can induce critical participants in a sector or activity to begin to 
follow relevant rules out of self-interest. Without a significant level of self-interested buy-in, 
rule-following behaviour is difficult to impose in developing-country contexts if we rely 
solely on external enforcement. Clearly, these opportunities are likely to be limited, but they 
constitute a vitally important starting point for effective anti-corruption efforts.  
In the subsections that follow we identify four types of anti-corruption strategies, each 
creating insider support for rule-following behaviour that can have a positive developmental 
outcome. The four types are indicative rather than comprehensive, and it is likely that other 
variants may emerge in the course of further research. Moreover, real-world cases may be 
classified under more than one type of strategy if they match the features of more than one 
pure type. Common to all four strategies is that, in different ways, they all create a base of 
support for rule-following behaviour amongst some of the critical participants in an activity. 
A variety of strategies are emerging under each of these four types, and therefore we refer 
to each as an anti-corruption strategy ‘cluster’.  
7.1. ACE strategy 1: Aligning incentives  
The poor design of developmental policies can deliberately or inadvertently create adverse 
incentives for rent capture that may in some cases be avoided with better policy design. This 
is most likely when the developmental policy also benefits many organisations that have 
some voice and bargaining power in society. The structure of incentives in some sectors may 
have evolved such that productive investments have become too risky, or the returns to 
productive activities have become too low or negative once all market and risk conditions 
are accounted for. Potentially productive organisations that may otherwise not have 
engaged in damaging types of corruption may engage in rule violations as normal business 
practice as a result.  
If the evidence suggests that feasible rule changes would give the above firms sufficient 
returns for them to behave in rule-following ways to achieve better development outcomes, 
we can identify an anti-corruption strategy that is feasible and has high impact. The focus of 
research is to identify whether changes in the relative returns to different types of activities 
are feasible, and whether these are likely to create support for rule-following productive 
behaviour by critical insiders.  
Incentive restructuring is most likely to be feasible in activities where market failures have 
justified policy interventions to allocate rents to achieve public policy goals. In many of these 
policy areas the incentives created can become dysfunctional for the achievement of these 
goals. The dysfunctional outcomes are typically associated with what we have earlier 
described as policy-distorting corruption. The recipients of public resources and contracts 
then fail to deliver on the policy goals but continue to operate through different types of 
collusive arrangements with public officials. These situations of policy-distorting corruption 
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are unfortunately frequently observed in developing- and emerging-country contexts. In a 
subset of these cases we may find that some of the organisations involved have a proven 
capability to deliver better outcomes, but they face adverse incentives because policy has 
been badly constructed or has ignored underlying risks and costs. The delivering-country 
context with its multiple market failures and high transaction costs creates many such 
dysfunctional policy outcomes where corruption has very damaging effects.  
It is obviously not feasible to change incentives to achieve better outcomes in all such cases. 
Indeed, the task of research is to identify, on the basis of evidence, the promising areas for 
these types of anti-corruption initiatives. The feasibility of an incentive restructuring strategy 
will depend on the possibility of making productive activity sufficiently attractive for many or 
most organisations in the sector such that they no longer need to engage in rule violations 
and corruption to achieve satisfactory returns. If this can be achieved, there is a good chance 
of creating internal support for rule-following behaviour, and therefore for anti-corruption, 
in these specific activities, while achieving improved developmental outcomes. In these 
cases, the self-interest of a critical number of participants can be mobilised to support the 
enforcement of specific rules and anti-corruption policies that now benefit them, thereby 
also helping to improve developmental outcomes.   
7.1.1. Examples  
i) Bangladesh skills sector 
Bangladesh has committed to spend more than $1 billion over the next five years in skills 
programmes funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other development 
partners. However, the global evidence shows that success in skills programmes is low. A 
World Bank evaluation of skills programmes in India carried out in 2015 looked at a number 
of programmes over the previous five years with a spend of $500 million and found a 
success rate of only 28% in terms of job placement after training. Even this dismal figure may 
be overstated as many skills providers are paid based on their employment success, and this 
creates strong incentives for overreporting employment. In Bangladesh, an early evaluation 
of the ADB-funded skills programme, Skills for Employment Investment Programme (SEIP), 
found a remarkably high employment success rate of 68%. However, in our preliminary 
investigations we spoke to several SEIP training providers and, off the record, they admitted 
to significant levels of overreporting of employment. The actual employment success is 
unlikely to be higher than in India and could even be lower given the poor quality of many 
training providers. Not only does this type of fraudulent overreporting result in a waste of 
resources, it also hides the data that could help to identify the source of the problem so that 
policy resources could be allocated better.  
The irony is that Bangladesh has a large garment manufacturing sector that claims it is short 
of skilled workers and the training that we focused on targets this sector. To understand the 
types of incentive problems that may be generating fraud in this sector, we worked with a 
development implementation partner who had access to invoice data from a dozen training 
providers. Follow-up checks on trainees who were reported as being in employment by the 
training providers revealed significant overreporting of employment by some providers (in 
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some cases exceeding 50%), but with others engaging in almost no overreporting. This data, 
which would normally have been hidden without the detailed tracer checking of actual 
employment (as opposed to the reported employment in the invoices) raised a very 
important question: why were there such significant variations in the degree of 
overreporting across similar training providers servicing the same garments industry?  
Here lateral thinking about incentives in the skills training market was necessary to 
understand possible causes and to develop a testable hypothesis. We know from theoretical 
and empirical work in the field that the productivity enhancement achieved through skills 
training depends not only on the quality and relevance of the training, but also on the 
organisational capabilities of employing firms. Enhancing worker skills does not add much to 
productivity in badly organised firms, but it does in well-organised firms. This is because 
when the production line is not working smoothly, a skilled worker cannot add more value 
relative to an unskilled worker from the factory gate. As our training providers were all 
providing basic skills to entry-level workers in the garments industry, and their training 
capabilities were vetted by the implementation partner, we can assume that there were no 
significant differences in the quality and relevance of the training delivered by the providers. 
Was there a difference in the organisational capabilities of the employing firms that could 
explain the different incentives of training providers?  
To test this hypothesis, we constructed an index of the organisational capabilities of the 
firms to which trainees were being sent by the training providers. We used data on the unit 
value of exports from each firm, their compliance with building regulations and the type of 
firm (exporting, domestic market, tailor shop or self-employed) to construct an index for 
each firm. We then looked at the distribution of trainees going from each training provider 
to firms to construct a composite number for the organisational capabilities on the demand-
side for each training provider. As expected, we found that training providers that were 
lucky enough to be supplying high-quality firms found their trainees quickly secured 
employment and they engaged in almost no fraud. But training providers that were 
surrounded by low-quality firms found their trainees had great difficulty finding jobs because 
these employers were just as happy to employ unskilled workers from the factory gate at a 
slightly lower wage. These training providers engaged in much higher levels of fraud, and 
their training quality was likely to deteriorate as well over time. Nevertheless, the evidence 
suggests that the corruption by training providers was not initially related to differences in 
their capabilities but rather to the differences in the effective demand for trainees that was 
due to differences in the capabilities of the firms they were sending workers too. The 
incentive problem was that the training providers were paid by outcome, but no amount of 
feasible effort could achieve a high employment outcome for training providers supplying to 
low-capability firms.  
Our finding showed that the design of the skills programme was creating incentives for 
fraud, and that this fraud distorted the available data that could help us design training 
schemes better. Moreover, the evidence showed that if the incentives were aligned, training 
providers would not engage in fraud even in the Bangladeshi environment because they 
could make a decent return on investment. There is a critically important policy conclusion 
that emerges from this study: the incentives of training providers can be restructured, but it 
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requires a restructuring of the links between skills programmes and firm-capability 
development.  
Public investments in skills programmes need to be tied to investments in improving the 
organisational capabilities of firms on the demand side. We already have examples of such 
programmes in Bangladesh, and we know that investment in organisational capabilities can 
result in improved firm organisation, and that this has a huge multiplier effect on the 
productivity achieved by skills training. However, before our research, the implications of 
this for skills training providers, and the incentives created for fraud, had not been 
identified. The research suggests the vital importance of joining up skills training with 
capability-development programmes, not only to address the adverse incentives that lead to 
fraud, which may be wasting no less than a third of the investment in skills programmes, but 
also to design a joined-up programme that actually creates a large numbers of jobs, and to 
achieve the productivity growth that can increase wages.  
ii) Vocational training in Tanzania 
Tanzania is growing rapidly and so is its population, which is expected to reach 90 million by 
2030. The country needs to create employment for large groups of young people every year, 
many of whom come from the poorest segments of society. Around 850,000 young people 
enter the country’s job market annually, but only 50,000 to 60,000 formal-sector jobs are 
created each year and many of those are in the service economy. As a result, between 2007 
and 2016 the inactivity trends in the country have been increasing, especially among women, 
to reach 25% of the total population. Youth labour employment is also among the lowest in 
the East Africa region (Andreoni, 2018). Against this background, vocational skills 
development and the effective deployment of skills in productive organisations have been 
recognised as priorities for the government, particularly in relation to Tanzania’s 
industrialisation ambitions. The World Bank as well as Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GiZ) and DFID have also invested millions of dollars in the 
sector over the years, including programmes like the GiZ-led Employment for Sustainable 
Development in Africa (E4D/SOGA) and the World Bank’s Tanzania Education and Skills for 
Productive Jobs (ESPJ) programme. 
Despite efforts by government, international organisations and the private sector to invest 
in skills development, the skills sector remains weak and the quality of trainees largely 
inadequate while frustration among the youth increases every day. Mistrust in the sector 
has also grown over the years with allegations of corruption in the use of funds, from the 
collection of the Skills Development Levy (SDL) to the governance of the financing system by 
government authorities and, finally, the delivery of training services by the public vocational 
education and training (VET) institutions. The SDL rate is also significantly higher in Tanzania 
than in comparable countries, and there are worries that this can create a competitive 
disadvantage and discourage formal employment.   
As a result, companies and government institutions have increasingly diverged and 
companies have taken an exit option. Indeed, companies have disengaged from VET centres, 
are reluctant to run dual apprenticeships and internships programmes where uptake 
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remains very low, and have simply started lobbying for a reduction in the SDL – from 6% to 
5% in 2013 and from 5% to 4.5% in 2016. Given this dislocation between different interests 
in the sector, international organisations have also found it very challenging to implement 
any skills development programme effectively. Concerns have been raised about flows and 
the use of new funds, and the idea of pumping more money into the sector has been 
questioned. 
The SOAS ACE approach to the skills sector in Tanzania was to first conduct an in-depth rents 
analysis of the sector to identify potential vulnerabilities to corruption and lack of 
accountability along the chain – from financing to governance and implementation of skills 
training. Initial pilot interviews with multiple stakeholders revealed a very opaque system 
and lack of any evidence on the scale and breadth of corruption, despite several allegations 
of large amounts of funding being diverted from the sector. This rents analysis was a key 
step in tracking the funds, disentangling the formal and informal practices in the sector, and 
identifying the different interests of the stakeholders involved. 
The rents analysis generated the first ever quantitative evidence on the volume of SDL 
collected and allocated over the last ten years (Andreoni, 2018). It also revealed a number of 
inconsistencies in the legal system (the VETA Act and amendments) which allowed the 
potential diversion of funds from the skills development sector. There is evidence that SDL 
collection significantly increased over the last decade, with a growing contribution from 
small and medium companies. Despite this, the funding allocated to VET centres and other 
education-related institutions remained roughly constant and the amount of SDL funds 
reported in government and private-sector negotiations is missing a large sum, above $40 
million. The underfunding of VET institutions also triggered a series of informal practices and 
opened new avenues for corruption. We discovered that VET institutions – especially in 
urban centres – had started using their training facilities to run short courses for which they 
were collecting fees up to five times higher than for long-term, SDL-funded courses. As a 
result, youths were overcharged for a number of short courses – often perceived as better – 
and companies who wanted to train or retrain their workforce had to pay these extra fees 
on top of the SDL.   
Over the years, the lack of quality skills, as well as dysfunction and corruption in the 
financing and delivery system, also induced companies to engage in rule-breaking behaviour 
including: SDL avoidance or underreporting; violations of worker immigration laws with 
foreign skills being brought into the country despite being more expensive; reduction in 
formal employment to avoid a fixed levy on the payroll; misuse of incentive schemes like 
national internships and dual apprenticeships in which tax rebates were introduced. Given 
these rule-breaking behaviours, the private sector with its own representative organisations 
have always found it difficult to push for dramatic reforms and ask for more government 
accountability. The government has pushed back, pointing out large tax irregularities and the 
unwillingness of the private sector to play their part. 
Against this complex background and misaligned interests, we looked for opportunities to 
re-align incentives for private and public actors to cooperate in the pursuit of their own 
interests to support skills development. For once, the government has a strong interest in 
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showing results in this sector – though it might not be willing to fully deploy the levy 
collected for the sector, it has already allocated part of the SDL to launch a rebate scheme 
which would allow companies willing to do on-the-job training in partnership with VET 
centres to get back a portion of the levy. VET centres are also looking to ‘formalise’ their 
targeted short-course training and generate more income and increase their salaries. All 
companies are keen to pay lower levies, but only a few are capable of using the incentives 
provided by the government effectively.  
We looked for ongoing pilot experiences which were already successful in Tanzania (and the 
region) and found that some companies had promoted collaborative initiatives of this type, 
even without levy rebates. In the mining sector in Arusha (north Tanzania), the need for 
skills and the importance of keeping skilled wages low motivated mining companies to 
create a sector-focused training within the public-owned VET centre in Moshi. The success of 
this collaborative scheme and willingness of mining companies to contribute to skills 
development are due to the fact that the firms were likely to see an increase in productivity 
from skilled labour and would know how to organise these skills effectively. 
The scalability of a rebate-based collaborative model like the one in the Moshi centre is 
made difficult by the fact that there are very few companies in Tanzania that could deliver 
proper on-the-job training and would be able to employ trainees afterwards, however. The 
majority of companies do not have sufficient technical and organisational capabilities, and 
are likely to abuse rebates, as has already happened in some pilot cases. To avoid this, and 
to design a feasible and impactful strategy, we conducted a stratified survey covering 300 
medium-to-large companies to identify firms with adequate capabilities, while at the same 
time testing new sector-specific collaborative models for skills development through a 
discrete choice experiment (DCE). The results of large data collection and DCE can orient a 
new incentive model for collaborative skills training led by companies in collaboration with 
VET centres and will allow us to ‘design for differences’. This means making sure that the 
rebate system initially targets only companies with sufficient technical and organisational 
capabilities. Dynamic incentives for smaller companies can be also introduced to improve 
their capabilities and enable them to graduate and access the scheme.1  
iii) Restructuring incentives in the Nigerian electricity sector 
Privatisation of the Nigerian electricity sector was a highly anticipated deregulation exercise 
in Africa for international investors and financial consortia. The reform launched in 2011 
envisaged the privatisation of six generating companies and 11 distribution companies. This 
was done successfully with newer private independent producers adding to generation 
capacity which currently totals just over 12,000 megawatts (MW). The transmission sector 
was not privatised, however. Average power distributed is around 4,000 MW and peak 
distribution capacity is 5,400 MW as a result of poor-quality distribution networks, a legacy 
of the pre-privatisation era. This is compounded by the fact that transmission capacity is 
 
1
 The SOAS-ACE evidence has informed the World Bank’s Tanzania ESPJ programme and has led to collaborative work to 
engage the Tanzanian government (Andreoni et al., 2019).  
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limited to 8,000 MW. Other logistical issues like inconsistent gas supply and pricing have 
added to the sector’s inefficiencies and have led to disappointment with the outcome of 
privatisation.  
The technical aspects mask another critical constraint to a well-functioning electricity sector 
in Nigeria, however. Both anecdotal evidence and the actions of the country’s premier anti-
corruption agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), point to 
extensive rent-seeking, capture and corruption in the sector. The agency is currently 
investigating power projects worth $16 billion, which were announced between 2005 and 
2018 and span the tenure of all Nigerian presidents since the country’s return to democracy, 
including the first term of current incumbent Muhammadu Buhari. The investigation targets 
all senior politicians and functionaries including ex-governors, ex-ministers and a former 
head of a large Nigerian bank. The accusation is that many of the power projects announced 
were not implemented as funds were allegedly diverted using a ‘revolving door’ of political 
connections. A report published in August 2017 by one of Nigeria’s most respected civil 
society organisations identified corruption as the main reason why the sector has not 
progressed at the expected pace. According to the report, the country lost 11 trillion naira 
(N) through corrupt practices in the sector from 1999 to 2017 (SERAP, 2017). In the years 
since 2015, bail outs and guarantees to the sector have totalled over N1200 billion (The 
N701 billion Payment Assurance Guarantee, the N300 billion Power and Aviation 
Intervention Facility and the N213 billion Nigeria Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility) but 
with not much to show for it. 
The privatisation process did not gain the confidence of investors either. Some investors 
were not allowed to conduct due diligence on companies they were buying, and it was 
worse for distribution companies that did not receive any sovereign guarantees while 
generating companies at least received partial risk guarantees. The absence of sovereign 
guarantees was a huge disincentive for genuine investors, leading to adverse selection 
where politically connected companies were the only ones that could risk bidding. Nigerian 
banks absorbed all the risks of these political transactions as international lenders were 
understandably reluctant to lend to the sector. 
The dominance of politically connected companies in a sector that is loss-making in 
aggregate terms explains the widespread illicit rent capture reported across the Nigerian 
electricity value chain, involving both private and public actors. In many cases this has been 
the only way in which these entities could make a ‘profit’. The process begins with politically 
influenced gas pricing agreements between suppliers and generators. The supply of gas is 
also a constraint (and is one issue being investigated by the EFCC) as there are insufficient 
pipelines and new projects have yet to be completed. Domestic gas producers also prefer 
selling abroad as the prices are better. The other point of collusion is through power 
purchase agreements (PPA) or the price at which generators are supposed to sell to the 
transmission company. Prices can be inflated in a manner that is well above production costs 
and engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts for some of the projects 
under investigation were designed to include ‘Waiver of Due Process Certification for 
Payment’ leading to the suspicion that payments were made before projects had been 
completed and in an opaque manner. Further down the chain, a common complaint against 
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distribution companies has been the practice of billing based on ‘estimated use’ which has 
enabled suppliers to overcharge customers. This has only recently been abolished.  
The technical inefficiencies meant there would be little or no return for (high) investments, 
which put off genuine investors in the national grid (except for one project with a partial risk 
guarantee from the World Bank). Consequently, the only firms willing to invest were 
politically connected companies that were confident of recouping their investments based 
on their proximity to powerful political coalitions that would enable them to engage in illicit 
practices. The sector is therefore in a low-level equilibrium where incentives to invest and 
upgrade in the national grid are absent, and technical inefficiencies have been exacerbated. 
Moreover, in a sector where demand is high and supply is severely constrained, there are 
strong perverse incentives for corrupt behaviour. For instance, buying diesel on the black 
market as fuel for captive generators is a huge corruption externality, as is ‘tapping’ into 
high voltage lines.  
Our research identifies high demands for electricity in small and medium manufacturing 
hubs like Nnewi, Onitsha and Aba where informal ‘power’ businesses supply ‘pay-as-you-go’ 
electricity to entrepreneurs who cannot get what they need from the grid. There are also 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have kept capacities idle for want of power 
supply, that are typically forced to look for other, often informal and illegal, ways to access 
power. Informal power suppliers can be legal (where enterprising individuals buy large 
generators to supply electricity to users in a specific area) but often there are operators 
around high voltage lines who supply electricity that is essentially stolen. Even stolen 
electricity results in cost escalation for SME owners, however, with some SME owners having 
reported electricity costs (as a percentage of production costs) of up to 40%. In comparator 
countries like India, this cost is usually between 20% to 30%. A recent article in Nature 
Sustainability calculates the ‘mean net cost of electricity’ from diesel generators in Nigeria is 
$1.6 billion per year (Farquharson et al, 2018). Once the environmental impact of diesel 
generators is added, the full social costs are much higher.  
The ACE strategy here is to recognise the difference between long-term and short-term 
responses. The long-term response is to address the structural problems of transmission 
infrastructure, improving collection and gas supply to increase generation. This will take 
many years, possibly decades, and requires investments in expensive infrastructure that are 
not feasible at the moment. The immediate response is to use the ACE approach to address 
incentives that could feasibly improve generation and supply power to SMEs which will 
create employment while reducing corruption risks. But anti-corruption measures are only 
likely to be feasible here if the overall strategy succeeds in aligning the interests of a 
sufficient number of powerful and productive organisations to support the enforcement of 
rules that enable better outcomes.  
The evidence suggests that it may be possible to restructure the incentives of potentially 
productive players, like SME owners, to become rule-following in their own interest. SME 
owners in clusters we have researched are already purchasing power legally (if informally) 
and are also paying for it over and above their metered use, which demonstrates their 
‘willingness to pay’. There is clearly effective demand for consistent power supply. The 
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Nigerian government’s push for off-grid supply (which is currently mostly solar but could be 
extended to gas to meet the demand) and the newly launched policy of ‘Eligible Customers’ 
(where users with a monthly consumption of over 2 MW can purchase electricity directly 
from a producer, bypassing the distribution company) have created policy spaces that the 
ACE strategy can exploit. Our research promises to empirically establish both the effective 
demand for off-grid electricity supply in SME clusters, and also how this can be delivered in 
ways that cut out the need for SME owners to engage in corruption.  
7.2. ACE strategy 2: Designing for differences  
Another set of rule-violations in developing countries stems from rules that are difficult to 
enforce because they do not recognise differences across individuals or organisations 
engaged in a sector or activity. This heterogeneity is often much greater in developing 
countries because development is an uneven process. The same activity or ‘industry’ may 
involve individuals or firms with very advanced characteristics in terms of technology or 
capital, but also many others with very low capabilities or capital. The result can often be 
that almost all individuals or organisations in a sector may end up violating rules but for very 
different reasons. Some of these reasons may be ‘reasonable’, for instance because the rules 
simply cannot be adhered to by some individuals or organisations given their capabilities, or 
because the systems do not exist to enable certification or compliance in time or at 
reasonable cost. At the same time, other violators may be entirely opportunistic and 
extractive, taking advantage of poor enforcement to violate rules that they may have 
complied with, with very adverse welfare outcomes.  
Anti-corruption measures are only likely to be effective in these contexts if there are feasible 
policy changes that can allow potentially compliant individuals or organisations to actually 
comply. The policy package may sometimes also require exit or upgrading strategies or other 
means of dealing with organisations that cannot comply, even with revised or simplified 
rules. For these organisations it is critical not only to achieve a broad base of support for the 
anti-corruption reforms, but also because without that, the enforcement of rules may result 
in significant immediate hardship or unemployment and a reduction in welfare. A package of 
policies that address these issues of heterogeneity can create support for rule adherence in 
a sufficient number of potentially compliant firms and organisations in a way that enhances 
welfare.  
Many entrenched sectoral corruption problems in developing countries are of this type. In 
these activities, most firms and organisations in the sector may appear to be corrupt, but 
closer investigation usually reveals that they are violating rules for very different reasons. 
One reason why anti-corruption is so difficult in many countries is that even organisations 
that want to comply often find that they have to violate rules. This means that when 
deliberately extractive organisations violate rules, their peers are unable to strongly resist 
them or demand their prosecution, because everyone has something to hide. Even worse, 
when external enforcement agencies appear, all firms in the sector resist sharing 
information or assisting their enforcement activities. This creates an environment that 
allows even more egregious violations by a few deliberately extractive and exploitative 
organisations or individuals. For anti-corruption to have horizontal support among the 
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participants in a sector, there has to be a substantial potentially compliant group. Since this 
often does not exist, anti-corruption is only likely to be feasible if policy can assist the 
emergence of a significant compliant group. Policy combinations that enable compliance can 
create a powerful base of support that can help to sustain improved rule-following 
behaviour and anti-corruption enforcement in these activities.  
7.2.1. Examples  
i) Building regulations in the Bangladeshi garments industry  
The role of corruption in the evasion of building regulations in the Bangladeshi garments 
industry came tragically to the fore with the Rana Plaza collapse in 2013, in which more than 
1,200 workers, mostly in the garments industry, lost their lives. Since then a number of 
initiatives have been undertaken by international buyers, including the Alliance and Accord 
initiatives, to carry out inspections of factories and to agree on upgrading to comply with 
international standards. This work is now at an advanced stage, and many Bangladeshi 
factories have made much progress in satisfying the international inspections. But the 
process has also revealed important shortcomings in our understanding of regulatory 
compliance and the different ways in which corruption affects compliance outcomes in 
developing countries.  
The garments industry, like many others, demonstrates huge internal diversity in 
Bangladesh, with world class firms, struggling firms that could become world class, and 
many smaller and undercapitalised firms that cannot easily upgrade but nevertheless 
provide significant employment opportunities to many people. Some of the incentives for 
corruption-driven evasion are driven by deliberate or inadvertent market restrictions 
created by regulatory policy. Regulatory requirements are typically much greater than the 
capacity of the state to certify in time, and perhaps greater than is required to achieve 
acceptable levels of safety in the context of a developing country. Here, many firms with 
export orders waiting for shipment often find they have to pay to get their certification, 
whether or not they are compliant. At the same time, a potentially long tail of low-capability 
firms, often engaged in subcontracting from the larger firms, are often not able to be 
compliant because they are undercapitalised and operating on very small margins. Shutting 
down these firms also triggers political costs for local politicians and economic costs for local 
bureaucrats and others who collect rents from such firms, and so the enforcement of 
regulatory rules on these types of firms is also resisted.  
The corruption that keeps the above types of non-compliant firms in business, with the 
active collusion of local politicians and bureaucrats, therefore has some characteristics of 
political corruption. But in this case, the political corruption simply responds to an 
immediate problem (without finding any long-term solutions) because shutting down these 
firms may indeed have a high welfare cost in the absence of alternative employment 
opportunities. The diversity of reasons behind the corruption around building regulations 
then triggers a third and even more serious policy-distorting corruption. Here, firms 
deliberately evade rules that they may have otherwise complied with, knowing that the 
degree of violations in the sector are high enough for them to enjoy impunity. The case of 
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Rana Plaza was an example of the latter. This is a good example of how the absence of any 
peer pressure or horizontal support for enforcement within a sector can rapidly result in 
unacceptable levels of violations. 
By identifying and measuring the relative scale of these different drivers of violations we can 
show the necessity of taking these differences into account. To achieve the support of a 
majority of firms in the sector, a number of issues need to be addressed. First, a broad-based 
stakeholder discussion is required to develop a consensus on the minimum building 
standards that will ensure safety but that are also feasible for the majority of firms in the 
industry to comply with. Second, if these standards imply that a tail of firms will be unable to 
comply, policy also needs to address an exit or upgrading strategy for these firms, 
particularly if it turns out that they employ significant numbers of workers. Finally, policy has 
to address certification capabilities on the side of the state, so that compliant factories can 
at least expect to get inspected and certified within the time cycle required for their exports. 
This policy combination would not normally be considered an anti-corruption strategy, but it 
promises to create sufficient internal support for adherence to regulatory norms. The usual 
anti-corruption policies focusing on detection and punishment have achieved little effect 
precisely because there has been little support within the sector for any enforcement of 
regulations.  
Under pressure from international buyers, particularly in Accord, the industry has pushed 
through an external inspection regime and upgrading of facilities to achieve compliance. This 
has by all accounts been a very costly exercise for the bigger firms, and it has led to many 
middling-capability firms struggling to comply and quite a few lower-capability firms going 
out of business. The sustainability of external inspections as well as a regulatory regime 
based on internal buy-in are also questionable as a long-term strategy. The ‘designing for 
differences’ approach to anti-corruption can provide a framework for thinking through these 
evolving policies in a sustainable way based on the multi-pronged evidence-based approach 
outlined above. 
ii) Tax incentives in Tanzanian export promotion zones 
Tanzania is still largely dependent on its mining resources, which account for almost 50% of 
the country’s export basket. Large segments of the population are still employed in 
agriculture where levels of productivity are still very low. The industrial sector is small and 
very few companies are able to compete in regional and international markets, while a few 
conglomerates control supply chains and extract rents from them (Andreoni, 2019). Against 
this background, the government of Tanzania has centred its five-year development plan on 
industrial development. In particular, new emphasis has been given to attracting 
investments and using export promotion zones (EPZs) as institutional and incentive vehicles 
for industrialisation.  
Tanzania is not the only country using these type of incentives, and indeed other players in 
the Eastern African region rely on special economic zones (SEZs) and EPZs to grant rents to 
private companies, including more advanced industrialisers like Kenya and Ethiopia. 
Tanzania loses substantial revenues annually due to these tax exemptions – losses 
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amounted to approximately $1.16 billion at their peak in 2011 but declined to $0.47 billion 
in 2016. The legal framework in Tanzania and in the East African Community (EAC) of which 
Tanzania is a member allows for tax exemptions. In Tanzania these exemptions can be 
granted through Government Notices, without requiring the approval of Parliament. 
EPZ/SEZs are the main institutional vehicles for incentivising companies. EPZs were established 
under the 2002 EPZ Act, before the establishment of the East African Customs Union of 2005, 
which currently defines the customs rules of Tanzania. Companies intending to set up new 
investments and export 80% of goods produced are eligible to receive tax exemptions 
including corporate tax for 10 years; reductions in import duties and value added tax (VAT) on 
capital goods, raw materials and construction materials;  reductions in VAT on utilities and 
wharfage; and an allowance for withholding tax on rent, dividends and interests. They also 
receive a series of other services delivered by the EPZ Authority related to visas, work permits, 
transfer of profits, dividends and royalties. Based on this generous package of incentives over 
160 companies were licensed in these zones and were expected to create 50,000 jobs by 2018. 
The evidence on how much this specific mechanism has cost in terms of missed tax revenue is 
fragmentary, however triangulation of several data sources including Ministry of Finance 
Reports on Tax Exemptions and Annual reports by the Controller and Auditor General suggest 
the scheme might have been abused (see also Therkildsen and Bak, 2019). Preliminary 
investigations also suggest that the governance of the scheme was designed in such a way that 
its enforceability was unlikely. For example, the EPZ/SEZ legislation allows for companies to be 
licensed as ‘individual’ EPZs without being located in a dedicated zone. This makes the 
management of the exemptions vulnerable to corruption, especially the management of 
duties exemptions, while the production formula used to calculate export performance is not 
functioning both from a tax and company perspective.  
Despite these challenges, and the limited number of companies licensed and operative, the 
last two governments have embarked on a multi-million-dollar investment in a new port in 
Bagamoyo – north of Dar es Salaam – which will also host a new EPZ. Given the significant 
public resources involved in the sector, and the fact that preliminary visits to EPZ/SEZ show 
very low levels of activity, we set up to research the functioning of this tax incentive scheme. 
We analysed the history of the scheme and informally approached companies to understand 
how the scheme was working for them. We paid particular attention to understanding why 
many companies licensed never started their operations, and why many of them have left 
since the launch of the scheme.  
Several rounds of interviews and data analyses pointed to a number of problems in the 
EPZ/SEZ incentive scheme. First, many companies were attracted by the understanding that 
the 80% export requirement meant export outside Tanzania. However, with Tanzania joining 
the EAC customs union in 2005, the entire EAC market became ‘domestic’ and therefore by 
law they had to find new markets outside the EAC if they did not want to lose their fiscal 
incentives. Since 2010, and increasingly since then, attempts by the Tanzanian tax authority 
to start enforcing national and EAC laws and implementing checks on exports escalated the 
contradictions in the EPZ/SEZ incentive scheme. Given that many of the companies attracted 
by the scheme set up operations in the country to export in the regional market, many of 
them faced significant pressure because they were unable to operate internationally. A 
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number of them closed, while others had an even stronger incentive to bribe in order to 
survive. Only those companies capable of finding markets outside the EAC managed to 
survive, remaining rule-following became very difficult for these firms. This is because 
meeting the stringent export requirements is not simple for the less competitive companies. 
The fact that the tax authority used the same ‘production formula’ to estimate exports and 
import duty exemptions meant that a number of businesses that may have been able to 
comply became unable to do so. 
We established a collaboration with the EPZ Authority to collect data on all the companies 
that were part of the scheme and to show a correlation between a firm’s export profile and 
cases of abuse of the system. This evidence supports the idea that instead of trying to 
increase checks, corruption can be better addressed if the EPZ incentive schemes take into 
account differences among firms. The SOAS ACE strategy suggests a redesign of eligibility 
criteria for access to tax exemptions, for instance by setting a qualification-criteria that limits 
access to the scheme to companies that have secured export contracts with international 
buyers. This would provide the EPZ Authority with a feasible mechanism to implement the 
EPZ/SEZ scheme in Tanzania and attract capable firms into the scheme. As for less capable 
companies which are already in the scheme, a different approach must be adopted, 
including supporting their export capacity or providing an exit option like the administrative 
development of an SEZ scheme with different and incremental export requirements for a 
limited period of time.  
7.3. ACE strategy 3: Building coalitions 
Sometimes anti-corruption efforts depend on constructing effective coalitions to assist with 
the enforcement of rules. However, not all collective action to fight corruption is likely to be 
effective in developing countries. This cluster of strategies identifies cases where collective 
action is likely to be effective, either on its own, or in combination with other strategies in 
line with our analysis of political settlements. In developing countries, the problem is that 
there is generally a rule by law, rather than a rule of law. This means that simply detecting 
violations and putting pressure on the state through the collective action of ordinary citizens 
is unlikely to assist enforcement on a sustainable basis. Collective action is only likely to have 
an impact if the organisations applying pressure for enforcement are at least as powerful, or 
more powerful, than the violating organisations and preferably also have some way of 
directly imposing costs on violators, for instance by not transacting with them or boycotting 
them in other ways. These conditions are hard to come by but given how often collective 
action is invoked in anti-corruption activities, it is useful to assess the likelihood that 
particular types of collective action may have sustainable effects.  
While external enforcement capabilities are generally weak in developing countries, 
particularly against powerful violators, in some cases there may be equally powerful 
interests that are hurt by particular types of violations which can be mobilised to assist the 
enforcement of socially desirable rules. Given the widespread corruption in developing 
countries, these types of opportunities may often be a useful place to start. A feasible anti-
corruption strategy may be to support collective action by relatively powerful groups whose 
own interests are aligned with the enforcement of particular policies or regulations. 
Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation 
37 
However, the feasibility of this collective action and the organisations that need to be 
involved have to be carefully analysed and identified.  
The organisation of collective action of this type is likely to require policy support, and again 
combinations of policies may be required, with the possibility of multiple ways of supporting 
the collective action. If collective action, even by a subset of powerful interests, is unlikely to 
sustain effective anti-corruption in the sector on its own, other supportive measures may 
have to be deployed in combination with the ongoing collective action. In some of these 
cases, the conclusion may be that collective action may be effective if it can be strengthened 
or targeted to different objectives, or armed with better information about the types and 
location of the infractions that are happening.  
7.3.1. Examples  
i) Bangladeshi textile industry fighting corrupt tariff evasion by fabric importers 
The growing textile industry in Bangladesh has been supported with tariffs and other 
incentives to develop as an infant industry. However, tariff protection has had very limited 
effects despite high official tariff rates because large quantities of imported fabrics manage 
to evade tariffs or taxes when selling in the local market. There are two main routes through 
which tariffs are evaded. First, corruption at border posts with India allows imported Indian 
fabrics to evade duties. Secondly, an even bigger source of evasion is through illegal sales of 
imported fabrics from bonded warehouses. The garments industry in Bangladesh is allowed 
to import fabrics tariff-free in bonded warehouses for re-export after processing into 
garments. However, many garments factory owners deliberately overestimate imported 
fabric requirements or in some cases engage in more direct fraud to import fabrics without 
any intention of re-export. The scale of these activities requires the collusion of and payoffs 
to customs officials and bonded warehouse inspectors from the National Board of Revenue 
(NBR). The surplus fabric is then dumped in the local market, evading tariffs. The scale of this 
evasion has seriously hurt the emerging textile industry, which has engaged in sustained 
collective action to try to reduce the scale of the evasion.  
The collective action of the textile industry has largely taken the form of pressure on the 
NBR to carry out raids on warehouses based on advance information that the textile industry 
collects, providing the NBR with machinery to check the thickness of yarn at border check 
posts (because different weights of yarn have different tariff rates) and generally to put 
pressure on the NBR to carry out their checks on bonded warehouses more rigorously. These 
collective-action activities carried out through the industry organisation, the Bangladesh 
Textile Mills Association (BTMA), have had some immediate effects on improving 
enforcement, but these have not been sustained. The bonded warehouse licence holders 
engaged in violations together with smugglers at the borders have proved to be more 
powerful in resisting and in paying off enforcement agencies. 
The size of the textile industry in Bangladesh suggests that key players should have been 
more successful in their collective action than they have been. Is the distribution of power 
such that collective action in this area is not likely to support an anti-corruption strategy or 
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has the thrust of the collective action been in the wrong direction? One possibility is that the 
scale of the evasion is so big that the revenues generated can buy off a lot of enforcement 
agency efforts. If the scale of evasion is very big, it is worth asking if the tariffs are actually 
providing any significant effective protection to the textile industry. The NBR statistics on 
official imports of fabrics (which record imports that actually pay tariffs) show that these 
imports are very small relative to the size of the domestic market and the availability of 
imported fabrics. We are working with insider sources in the NBR and with the BTMA to 
estimate the scale of evasion and the effective rate of protection that is afforded to the 
textile industry by the nominally high tariffs.  
The emerging evidence suggests that a more effective collective-action strategy for the 
textile industry may be to lobby to reduce tariffs down to a level where it is no longer viable 
for tariff evaders to pay the necessary bribes, and at the same time, the textile industry 
could seek infant-industry support in other ways. This is because the effective protection is 
already very low and is unlikely to be increased based on existing collective-action strategies. 
There is currently resistance within the BTMA to any strategy of reducing tariffs, but 
evidence on effective rates of protection, and on other alternatives for infant-industry 
support, could gradually help to make the BTMA collective action much more effective by 
targeting an alternative policy goal compared to the very poor results currently being 
achieved. Finally, any reduction in corruption that would strengthen the effective protection 
of the infant textile industry would only be welfare-enhancing if the strategy was one of 
temporary protection that would gradually be withdrawn as the industry became globally 
competitive and able to sell to domestic consumers at the same price as imported fabrics. 
This too would need to be factored into the policy discussions with the BTMA on feasible 
collective action that could reduce corruption but also have a positive impact on 
developmental outcomes.  
ii) Smuggling in Tanzania 
Despite its vast natural resources and the fact that a large part of the population is 
employed in the agricultural sector, in Tanzania staple commodities including rice and sugar 
remain scarce and their production is largely uncompetitive. Even in the case of rice, where 
production has increased in recent years, the country is still importing large amounts and 
price variations remain significant across regions and districts. In the case of sugar, the 
reported annual gap is around 150,000 metric tonnes, and no industrial sugar is available in 
the region. This means that several companies using industrial sugar as raw material in the 
manufacturing of food, beverages and pharmaceuticals – to mention just a few – have to 
import sugar to produce their products. 
The allocation of import licences for commodities like sugar and rice is at the centre of the 
political economy of least developed countries such as Tanzania. Large segments of the rural 
population are involved in rice and sugar production and they depend on them as cash 
crops. These commodities are also part of the consumption basket of all citizens. Thus, and 
especially during elections, politicians are concerned about guaranteeing their full 
availability through imports. Powerful organisations and their clientelistic networks exploit 
domestic scarcity. In some cases, they create scarcity artificially by hoarding commodities, or 
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lobbying for import licences by creating a perception of scarcity. Given the availability of 
cheap sugar and rice from abroad, powerful organisations can capture rents by smuggling 
and other forms of customs-rules violations such as underreporting.  
The unproductive rents capture from sugar and rice also generates an intricate web of 
domestic and regional conflicts among powerful organisations which unfold in complex 
corruption processes and government litigations around import duty exemptions. For 
example, for each country including Tanzania in the EAC customs union, sugar is a prominent 
sensitive item and accusations of smuggling and unfair trade practices in the region have led 
to several corruption prosecutions. Countries like Kenya with low levels of rice production 
have also signed bilateral agreements to import cheap rice. Lower-quality rice coming from 
other countries have then been mixed with Tanzanian rice by some traders and sold at the 
same price premium as Tanzanian rice across the region. 
We set out to investigate the commodity-specific smuggling activities in the region, with a 
focus on Tanzania and two commodities – i.e. rice and sugar. We first collected eight-digit 
trade data over the last two decades for Tanzania and all its trading partners to assess the 
extent of underreporting. Mirror statistics revealed significant multi-million-dollar gaps 
between the declaration of sugar exports abroad and import declarations in Tanzania. We 
also found evidence of a certain degree of cyclicality. Underreporting is correlated with the 
political cycle, with pre-election years registering large gaps of smuggled sugar. The 
alignment between smuggling and elections suggests that these commodities might be used 
as policy rents and thus involve very powerful organisations. The evidence for rice is less 
dramatic, suggesting that smuggling of rice has reduced alongside the increase in domestic 
production over the last decade. 
Building on this evidence, the SOAS ACE research moved towards a comparative rents 
analysis for each of the two commodities to explain why and how smuggling differed 
between these two commodities and how anti-corruption strategies might need to leverage 
different coalitions of interests and groups. We identified seven commodity-specific causes 
of corruption and different processes. They include the link with financing of political 
elections; evidence of smuggling of both rice and sugar through the Zanzibar smuggling 
route; and the political management of food scarcity and trade bans. The fact that each of 
these processes unfolded in different ways for the two commodities made us realise that 
this work requires further investigation of commodity-specific coalitions of producers in 
Tanzania who would have an interest in fighting smuggling. 
In the case of sugar, the rents analysis revealed the existence of a potential coalition of the 
four main sugar producers already cooperating in the sugar board. This coalition of 
producers managed to lobby the government against traders and alleged smugglers and to 
secure exclusive import licences for the entire sugar gap in 2017. While this move raised 
some hope, and received the highest government support, the new import licensing scheme 
did not result in more domestic production and indeed the producers sold back their 
exclusive import licence to the traders. The government has since then moved towards 
considering another potential model, that is, government-controlled import in bulk. While 
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this scheme might overcome the sugar gap, it is still vulnerable to corruption practices and 
does not reduce the incentive for smuggling.  
The SOAS ACE evidence suggests that while the government was originally moving in the 
right direction by allocating the import-licencing rent to the sugar producers, it failed in 
disciplining this rent. While collective action among the producers was important to prevent 
the rents going back to traders/smugglers, it also prevented the government from rewarding 
the sugar producers differently according to their willingness to use the rent productively. A 
feasible strategy for the sugar industry would be to peg the import-licence quota for the 
producers to their annual increases in production. Over time, the more sugar producers 
increased their domestic production, the larger would be their import quota. This strategy is 
feasible because it would leverage the self-interest of the sugar producers who do not want 
to lose their import-licence rents, but also allow those which are not willing or capable to 
scale up their sugar production to exit the sector gradually. The recent investment in sugar 
production by one of the most powerful businessmen in Tanzania incentivised by policy 
rents suggests this is a viable way forward and would make the collective action among 
capable sugar producers even stronger. 
7.4. ACE strategy 4: Resolving rights 
A further cluster of corruption problems can emerge because there are overlapping or 
contested rights of different parties, and the only resolution available to them is to engage in 
corruption to resolve disputes. Anti-corruption efforts in these areas will only have any 
insider support if policy finds ways of identifying, addressing and resolving the underlying 
conflicts. The problem here is deeper than the absence of a rule of law (which is also the 
case). That is because a rule of law may have impersonally adjudicated between parties on 
the basis of their legal rights, but a rule of law arbitration is likely to fail if each party to a 
dispute has a partial right or if there are errors in the documentation establishing the rights 
of all parties to a dispute. It is quite common in developing countries for several parties to 
be in conflict over land, resources or rents that result from (sometimes equally legitimate) 
overlapping claims over particular assets or interpretations of policies.  
This type of conflict can sometimes emerge because policies and regulations are (often 
deliberately) badly designed and confer conflicting rights and rents to different people or 
sometimes to the same person. For instance, there may be several interpretations of the 
duty payable on a particular import. Resolving these conflicts requires bribes, and in the 
simplest case, where confusion is deliberately created to collect rents, this is just a variant of 
an artificial restriction-driven corruption. A more significant and less tractable case involves 
conflicts over rights deriving from documents establishing overlapping rights that may each 
have some legitimacy. In this case, the underlying problem is not just a market restriction or 
distortion, but something deeper involving conflicting legitimate claims. For instance, 
different systems of rights may have existed over land and the conflicts between these rights 
may not yet have been fully resolved. Moreover, taking advantage of this lack of clarity, 
opportunistic and extractive individuals or organisations may have manufactured fake 
documents knowing that it will be difficult to distinguish between genuine conflicts between 
documents and artificially manufactured ones.  
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For this type of problem, clarifications or changes in rules or improvements in administrative 
enforcement capabilities or even collective-action responses are likely to be inadequate for 
resolving existing disputes and may not suffice to rule out future disputes unless critical 
anomalies in the underlying rights can be gradually addressed. In the meantime, effective and 
legitimate conflict-resolution processes have to be devised that can find compromise solutions 
that offer parties an alternative, cheaper and more predictable mechanism of conflict 
resolution compared to competitively bribing land administration officials, judges and others.  
7.4.1. Example 
i) Corruption in establishing and protecting land rights in Bangladesh  
Corruption in establishing and protecting property rights over land is a major source of 
harassment for millions of citizens in Bangladesh, and hundreds of millions across the 
developing world. According to one estimate, of the roughly 1.8 million cases pending in the 
courts in December 2000, 1.4 million were land-related cases, and the average time in court 
for a land-related case was 7.6 years (Barkat and Roy, 2004). These disputes take so long to 
resolve not because the records cannot be found, but rather because they can be found and 
there are conflicts between different records and between the records and possession. In 
other words, the problem is only partly one of shortcomings in record-keeping and is mainly 
to do with fundamental inconsistencies in the records.  
Anti-corruption and governance reforms in this area have focused on the digitisation of land 
records and transferring the process of mutating land (recording changes in land rights with 
the land office after sale or transfer) into online ‘e-mutation’ systems. There is undoubtedly 
some corruption in land administration in Bangladesh that can be attributed to officers 
exploiting their asymmetric information to extract rents, particularly from less-educated 
citizens when they come to register or mutate their rights. In principle, e-mutation and other 
digitisation arrangements could reduce this type of administrative corruption. Unfortunately, 
these extractions are a small part of the problem in the sector. Moreover, the evidence is that 
poor and less-educated people face high costs in navigating through the digital systems, which 
in any case only allow the submission of applications online and do nothing to resolve conflicts 
with the documents of other individuals. A recent study of Jessore district in Bangladesh, 
which led the trialling of e-mutations, found that the time, cost and number of visits required 
to complete the e-mutation process actually increased compared to the paper submission 
process (Reza-E-Rabbi, 2019). This may just be a temporary problem, but the e-mutation 
process certainly does not deal with the problem of how to resolve inconsistencies in the land 
records themselves, which may reflect legitimate overlapping claims.  
Our research here is identifying through case studies how conflicts in land records, 
possession and mutation records are actually resolved in different cases. Paradoxically, the 
confusing formal and informal institutional structure that has allowed multiple points of 
entry and corruption to contest these rights may well have emerged as a functionally useful 
safety valve that allows disputes to be gradually resolved through a process of attrition, even 
though at high cost in terms of corruption and time. Finding a sustainable resolution to this 
form of corruption requires a better understanding of the sources of the problem, beyond 
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the asymmetric information disadvantage that the e-mutation system is supposed to 
resolve. An understanding of the nature of these disputes may allow a public discussion of 
alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms as these would be the only sustainable 
alternative to the current ‘conflict-resolution system’ involving corruption and prolonged 
contestation and litigation.  
7.5. Mitigation strategies when corruption is intractable 
but has high welfare costs 
There are many areas where corruption is considerable and has significant welfare costs. The 
ACE approach is particularly useful in identifying areas where neither standard anti-
corruption strategies nor the self-sustaining strategies that ACE looks for are likely to work. 
In some cases, the right response is to postpone addressing these problems, and focus 
instead on corruption problems that can be feasibly addressed. This allows us to build 
support for more difficult problems at a later date, and is our theory of change. However, in 
some cases, the corruption in question has significant adverse effects on poor people and 
parking these problems is not an option. Instead, we need to look for ‘mitigation strategies’ 
that can reduce the costs to the poorest of particularly intractable forms of corruption, even 
though we cannot find a feasible way to address this corruption immediately.  
The example of the extractive sector in Nigeria fits this very well. The collusion of many 
powerful organisations in sharing the rents of the extractive sector, with broad patronage 
coalitions that spread the benefits across society, makes it very difficult to identify strategies 
that would leave a sufficient number of powerful interests better off by behaving less 
corruptly. However, ignoring the massive social and environmental damage that is caused by 
these activities is also not acceptable. Part of the ACE research is also to identify these 
intractable but important problems and to suggest mitigation strategies. 
7.5.1. Example: the Nigerian extractive sector  
Our scoping of the extractives sector in Nigeria suggests that systemic reform at the sectoral 
level is unlikely to succeed. The capture of rents related to the oil sector is both endemic 
among the politically powerful in Nigeria and provides rents for redistribution that allow 
some ‘live and let live’ coalitions to provide political stability. Oil rents are therefore deeply 
embedded in the reproduction of the Nigerian political settlement. Local residents involved 
in illegal artisanal refining also secure incomes higher than in opportunities in other sectors. 
A Chatham House report from 2013 estimates daily losses of crude at 100,000 barrels and 
yearly losses between  $3 billion to $8 billion, largely due to illegal activities (theft) in the 
sector (Katsouris and Sayne, 2013). The fact that all tiers of this corruption pyramid are 
making significant rents means there are no obvious quick solutions of the feasible ACE type. 
Given the powerful interests involved, an alternative configuration of interests that would 
behave differently in their self-interest is not possible here. Hoping for behaviour to change 
without a feasible change in these perverse incentives is why sustained anti-corruption 
efforts have failed to date.  
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The involvement of the country’s powerful political players in corruption in this rent-rich 
sector has had significant ramifications at the meso and micro level. If oil revenues are being 
hidden and transferred at the highest levels, lower-level thefts have to be either allowed, or 
are difficult to clamp down on. In some cases, these lower-level thefts have very high-level 
support and part of the rents are transferred up the chain. We are particularly concerned 
with the welfare and environmental impact of some of these activities because of their 
magnitude and their impact on the poor. These are the effects of oil-sector-related 
corruption associated with the theft of crude in poor areas of Nigeria that result in 
significant health and environmental damage. This aspect of corruption does not just 
damage Nigeria’s economic growth but also the social fabric of the Delta region. 
Our research of the meso and micro effects of oil-sector corruption (mainly through 
‘artisanal refining’) in the Niger Delta aims to identify mitigating strategies. However, the 
integration of this theft as part of the national system of rent extraction from the oil sector 
makes us pessimistic about the chances of directly addressing this corruption. Addressing 
the larger causes of corruption will need systemic reform and in the medium to short term 
this looks difficult to achieve. Our research disentangles some of the flows of oil-related 
rents in the Niger Delta to identify areas where policy can reduce some of the harmful 
effects of this corruption. For instance, how feasible would it be to use the network of 
primary healthcare centres to offer inexpensive treatments for pollution-related conditions 
like skin allergies for artisanal refiners? As one of the important goals of poor people 
engaged in illegal artisanal reforming is to build homes for themselves, could the intensity of 
artisanal refining be reduced using credit for housing? When very entrenched types of 
corruption cause great public harm, these are the types of mitigation questions that we 
need to address. The resources that are wasted in trying to reduce corruption in these types 
of areas could be better allocated to mitigation activities if the infeasibility of anti-corruption 
strategies in these areas was better recognised.  
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8.  The research agenda 
The SOAS ACE research agenda aims to put forward an alternative route to identifying 
feasible and effective anti-corruption strategies in developing countries. This is based on the 
development of our proposition that anti-corruption strategies that work in rule-of-law 
contexts will not necessarily work in contexts where the rule of law is weak. Transparency 
and accountability reforms implicitly assume that when rule violations are detected and 
accountable individuals are identified, there will be effective punishment or penalties if the 
court system is working reasonably well. This ignores the reality of political settlements in 
developing countries where the powerful are not subject to rules in the same way as the less 
powerful.  
Indeed, misguided applications of anti-corruption strategies in contexts where they are not 
suited have not just wasted time and money, they have sometimes had unintended negative 
effects. In many cases, these initiatives have provided additional tools to the powerful to 
harass their enemies. There is no dearth of evidence on how anti-corruption commissions in 
developing countries are used to pick up members of opposition parties or how court rulings 
are systematically influenced, ignored or later overturned even in developing countries with 
apparently good institutions. These problems cannot be solved simply by ‘strengthening’ 
institutions (whatever that means) because institutions work in ways that reflect the 
underlying distribution of power in society. That is a much more difficult task that takes time.  
The distribution of power in a society only changes gradually if policy can incrementally 
change the facts on the ground. Our anti-corruption approach attempts to do this by 
identifying welfare-enhancing strategies that involve greater adherence to specific rules by 
stakeholders who are involved in production or service-delivery decisions. The aim is not just 
to reduce specific instances of corruption, but also to change the facts on the ground by 
gradually increasing the number of productive organisations and improving service delivery. 
This, we believe, is the sustainable path to radical anti-corruption and governance changes 
in developing countries.  
Together, the four clusters of anti-corruption strategies identified in the last section identify a 
research agenda for further work on policy-relevant anti-corruption. The approach can be 
used for examining corruption issues affecting both the public and private sectors and for 
identifying relevant interdependencies between policies that seek to address corruption. The 
aim in both our private-sector and public-policy research is to engage in a number of projects 
in different priority areas to generate evidence on the impact and feasibility of different types 
of anti-corruption strategies. The anti-corruption strategy that is the focus of each project will 
be located in one or more of the strategy clusters discussed above, and each study will also be 
focused on a particular priority area in one or more of our study countries, initially Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Bangladesh. The impact and feasibility evidence will build up an evidence base 
on the difficulty and desirability of anti-corruption strategies in each cluster, with further 
differentiation across priority areas and types of sectors and countries. Over the longer term, 
this evidence will help us to design better anti-corruption strategies not only in the particular 
sectors and countries being studied, but it will help to deepen our understanding of effective 
policy design for anti-corruption policies in a wide range of economic and political contexts.   
Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation 
45 
References 
Ades, A. and R. Di Tella (1996) 'The causes and consequences of corruption: a review of recent empirical 
contributions', IDS Bulletin (Liberalization and the New Corruption) 27 (2): 6-11. 
Andvig, J. and K. Moene (1990) 'How corruption may corrupt', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 
3 (1): 63-76. 
Andreoni, A. (2018) Skilling Tanzania: improving financing, governance and outputs of the skills development 
sector. ACE Working paper series No. 6/2018. London: SOAS University of London. 
Andreoni, A. (2019) 'A generalised linkage approach to local production systems development in the era of 
global value chains, with special reference to Africa', in: Ravi K., Noman, A. and Stiglitz, J. (eds) The quality of 
growth in Africa, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Andreoni, A., C. Jesse and J. Turkewitz (2019) Improving governance and accountability in the financing and 
delivering of vocational and technical training: findings of a study of governance, accountability and 
performance of the skills development levy. World Bank Policy Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Barkat, A. and P.K. Roy (2004) Political economy of land litigation in Bangladesh: a case of colossal national 
wastage. Dhaka: Association for Land Reform and Development (ALRD) and Nijera Kori. 
Campos, J.E. and S. Pradhan (eds) (2007) The many faces of corruption: tracking vulnerabilities at the sector 
level. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Farquharson, D., P. Jaramillo and C. Samaras (2018) Sustainability Implications of Electricity Outages in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Nature Sustainability (1): 589-597DFID (UK Department for International Development) (2015) 
Why corruption matters: understanding causes, effects and how to address them. Evidence Paper on 
Corruption. London: DFID. 
Huther, J. and A. Shah (2000) Anti-corruption policies and programs: a framework for evaluation. Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2501. Washington, DC: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department. 
Johnsøn, J., N. Taxell and D. Zaum (2012) Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption: assessing the state of the 
operationally relevant evidence on donors' actions and approaches to reducing corruption. U4 Issue October 
2012 No. 7. Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. 
Katsouris, C. and A. Sayne (2013) Nigeria's Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen 
Oil.  The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Chatham House: London 
Khan, M.H. (1995) 'State failure in weak states: a critique of new institutionalist explanations', in: Harriss, J., J. 
Hunter and C.M. Lewis (eds) The new institutional economics and third world development, pp. 71-86. London: 
Routledge. 
Khan, M.H. (2000a) 'Rent-seeking as process', in: Khan, M.H. and K.S. Jomo (eds) Rents, rent-seeking and 
economic development: theory and evidence in Asia, pp. 70-144. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Khan, M.H. (2000b) 'Rents, efficiency and growth', in: Khan, M.H. and K.S. Jomo (eds) Rents, rent-seeking and 
economic development: theory and evidence in Asia, pp. 21-69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Khan, M.H. (2002) 'Corruption and governance in early capitalism: World Bank strategies and their limitations', 
in: Pincus, J. and J. Winters (eds) Reinventing the World Bank, pp. 164-84. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Khan, M.H. (2004) 'State failure in developing countries and strategies of institutional reform', in Tungodden, 
B., N. Stern and I. Kolstad (eds) Toward pro-poor policies: aid institutions and globalization, Proceedings of 
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, pp. 165-95. Oxford: Oxford University Press and 
World Bank. 
Khan, M.H. (2005a) 'Markets, states and democracy: patron-client networks and the case for democracy in 
developing countries', Democratization 12 (5): 705-25. 
Khan, M.H. (2005b) 'The capitalist transformation', in Jomo, K.S. and E.S. Reinert (eds) Development economics: 
how schools of economic thought have addressed development, pp. 69-80. London and New Delhi: Zed Press 
and Tulika. 
Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation 
46 
Khan, M.H. (2006a) 'Determinants of corruption in developing countries: the limits of conventional economic 
analysis', in Rose-Ackerman, S. (ed.) International handbook on the economics of corruption, pp. 216-44. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Khan, M.H. (2006b) Governance and anti-corruption reforms in developing countries: policies, evidence and 
ways forward. G-24 Discussion Paper Series: Research Papers for the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four 
on International Monetary Affairs and Development  No. 42. New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development.  
Khan, M.H. (2010) Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions. Research Paper 
Series on Governance for Growth. London: SOAS University of London. 
Khan, M.H. (2012) 'The political economy of inclusive growth', in de Mello, L. and M.A. Dutz (eds) Promoting 
inclusive growth: challenges and policies, pp. 15-54. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
Khan, M.H. (2013) 'Political settlements and the design of technology policy', in Stiglitz, J., J.Y. Lin and E. Patel 
(eds) The industrial policy revolution 2. Africa in the twenty-first century, pp. 243-80. London: Palgrave.  
Khan, M.H. (2014) Corruption and private sector development: Bangladesh case study. DFID Corruption and 
Private Sector Development Study. Unpublished report. London: DFID. 
Khan, M.H. (2018) 'Political settlements and the analysis of institutions', African Affairs 117 (469): 636-55. 
Klitgaard, R. (1988) Controlling corruption. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Krueger, A.O. (1974) 'The political economy of the rent-seeking society', American Economic Review 64 (3): 
291-303. 
Lambsdorff, J.G. (2005) Consequences and causes of corruption: what do we know from a cross-section of 
countries? Universität Passau Wirtschaftwissenschaftliche Fakultät Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. V-34-05. Passau: 
University of Passau. 
Mathieson, C. (2014) Analysing the impact of corruption on private sector development in Nepal and identifying 
options for response. DFID Corruption and Private Sector Development Study. Unpublished report. London: 
DFID. 
North, D.C., J.J. Wallis, S.B. Webb and B.R. Weingast (eds) (2013) In the shadow of violence: politics, economics 
and the problems of development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Posner, R.A. (1975) 'The social costs of monopoly and regulation', Journal of Political Economy 83 (4): 807-27. 
Rauch, J.E. and P.B. Evans (2000) 'Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed 
countries', Journal of Public Economics 75 (1): 49-71. 
Reza-E-Rabbi, M. (2019) 'Sustainable land record management: a study of e-mutation at Jashore Sadar 
Upazilla'. Seminar Paper for 124th Advanced Course on Administration and Development. Dhaka: Bangladesh 
Public Administration Training Centre. 
Rock, M.T. and H. Bonnett (2004) 'The comparative politics of corruption: accounting for the East Asian 
paradox in empirical studies of corruption, growth and investment', World Development 32 (6): 999-1017. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978) Corruption: a study in political economy. New York: Academic Press. 
Roy, P. (2012) 'India's vulnerable maturity: experiences of Maharashtra and West Bengal', in: North, D., J. 
Wallis, S. Webb and B. Weingast (eds) In the shadow of violence: the problem of development for limited access 
order societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Socio Economic Rights and Accountability Projects (2017) From Darkness to Darkness: How Nigerians are 
Paying the Price for Corruption in the Electricity Sector. Lagos: SERAP 
Søreide, T. (2006) Is it wrong to rank? a critical assessment of corruption indices. CMI Working Papers  No. WP 
2006: 1. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Spector, B.I. (ed.) (2005) Fighting corruption in developing countries: strategies and analysis. Bloomfield, CT: 
Kumarian Press. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1989) 'Markets, market failures and development', American Economic Review 79 (2): 197-203. 
Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation 
47 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1996) Whither socialism? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Therkildsen, O. and A.K. Bak (2019) Democratisation in Tanzania. No Elections Without Tax Exemptions. ICDT 
Working paper No. 98. The International Centre for Tax and Development at the Institute of Development 
Studies, Brighton. 
Treisman, D. (2000) 'The causes of corruption: a cross national study', Journal of Public Economics 76: 399-457. 
World Bank (2000) Helping countries to combat corruption: progress at the World Bank since 1997. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium
SOAS University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H OXG
T +44 (0)20 7898 4447 • E ace@soas.ac.uk • W www.ace.soas.ac.uk
Disclaimer: This publication is an output of a research programme funded by UK aid from the UK 
Government. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 
the views of UK Government’s official policies.
Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from ACE research for their own publications. As 
copyright holder ACE, requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication.
About the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium:
ACE takes an  innovative approach to anti-corruption policy and practice. Funded 
by UK aid, ACE is responding to the serious challenges facing people and economies 
affected by corruption by generating evidence that makes anti-corruption real, and 
using those findings to help policymakers, business and civil society adopt new, 
feasible, high-impact strategies to tackle corruption.
ACE is  a partnership of highly experienced research and policy institutes based 
in Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania, the United Kingdom and the USA. The lead 
institution is SOAS, University of London. Other consortium partners are:
• BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD)
• BRAC James P. Grant School of Public Health (JPGSPH)
• Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)
• Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
• Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)
• Health Policy Research Group (HPRG), University of Nigeria Nsukka (UNN)
• Ifakara Health Institute (IHI)
• London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM)
• Palladium
• REPOA
• Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB)
• University of Birmingham
• University of Columbia
ACE also has a well established network of leading research collaborators  
and policy/uptake experts.
